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I. Introduction 
 
 This outline is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of higher education cases of interest to 
this audience. It is intended to provide general information, not binding legal guidance.  If you 
have a legal inquiry, you should consult an attorney in your state who can advise you on your 
specific situation.  
 
II. First Amendment and Speech Rights 
A. Garcetti / Citizen Speech 
 
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) 
In this Supreme Court case the Court held unanimously that a public employee’s speech 
that may concern their job, but is not ordinarily within the scope of their duties, is subject to First 
Amendment protection. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that Lane did not speak 
as a citizen when he was subpoenaed to testify in a criminal case, finding that Eleventh Circuit 
relied on too broad a reading of Garcetti. Garcetti does not transform citizen speech into employee 
speech simply because the speech involves subject matter acquired in the course of employment. 
The crucial component of Garcetti then, is, whether the speech “is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” (See Legal Update, July 
2016 for further discussion.) 
 
B. Faculty Speech 
 
Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014) 
 In this important decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinforced the 
First Amendment protections for academic speech by faculty members. (Important note, a 
previous opinion by the Ninth Circuit in this case dated September 4, 2013 and published at 729 
F.3d 1011 was withdrawn and substituted with this opinion.) Adopting an approach advanced in 
AAUP’s amicus brief, the court emphasized the seminal importance of academic speech.  
Accordingly, the court held that Garcetti does not apply to "speech related to scholarship or 
teaching" and reaffirmed that “Garcetti does not – indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, 
cannot – apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant to the official duties’ 
of a teacher and professor.” (See Legal Update, July 2016 for further discussion.) 
 
Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., 669 F. Appx 297 (5th Cir. 2017); Wetherbe v. Goebel, 
No. 07-16-00179-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1676 (Mar. 6, 2018) 
In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that a professor’s public statements opposing tenure were 
protected by the First Amendment. Professor James Wetherbe sued his employer, Texas Tech 
University, and the current and former deans of the business school where he taught. Wetherbe 
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claimed that the University and the deans violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him 
for publicly criticizing tenure in the academy. The district court granted Defendants' motion to 
dismiss, holding that Wetherbe's speech was not protected by the First Amendment as it did not 
involve a matter of public concern because "[t]enure is a benefit that owes its existence to, and is 
generally found only in the context of, government employment."   
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Wetherbe’s statements criticizing 
tenure were protected.  The court explained that "Whether speech addresses a matter of public 
concern is to be 'determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.'" As to the 
content of the speech, the court found that “Because these articles focus on the systemic impact of 
tenure, not Wetherbe's own job conditions, the content of the speech indicates that the speech 
involves a matter of public concern.” As to the form and context of the speech, the court 
emphasized the publicity and media coverage surrounding Wetherbe’s statements, and that the 
speech consisted of articles Wetherbe published in various media outlets.  The court also rejected 
arguments by the university that Wetherbe’s speech was made in the course of performing his job, 
as there was no reason to infer that writing articles on tenure or speaking to the press are part of 
Wetherbe's job duties.  
By contrast, in an earlier case, the Fifth Circuit had found that the First Amendment did 
not protect Wetherbe's decision to reject tenure or his personal views on tenure.  Wetherbe v. Smith, 
593 F. App'x 323, 327-29 (5th Cir. 2014). In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that because 
Wetherbe’s statements had been made solely to university employees during the course of his 
interview for a position, and had not been made publicly, they were not speech on a matter of 
public concern and therefore were not protected by the First Amendment. These two cases together 
demonstrate that it is not just the content of the speech that is important, but the forum and audience 
at which the speech is directed.  
In Wetherbe v. Goebel, No. 07-16-00179-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1676 (Mar. 6, 2018), 
a parallel case before a state appellate court of Texas, the sole issue on appeal was whether 
Wetherbe’s speech was a matter of public concern. The court reversed the dismissal of this state 
law claim and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings finding that “the 
continued value of academic tenure was a matter of public concern, conceptually distinct from any 
speech related to Appellant’s prior litigation or disputes with the university.” 
 
Buchanan v. Alexander, No. 18-30148 (5th Cir. March 22, 2019) 
 On March 22, 2019, the Fifth Circuit issued a decision finding that professor Teresa 
Buchanan’s termination for her classroom use of profanity and discussion of sex did not violate 
her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. While the court acknowledged that certain 
classroom speech was protected by the First Amendment, the court held that Buchanan’s speech 
was not protected as it did not serve an academic purpose.  
 Professor Buchanan was a highly productive scholar and teacher at Louisiana State 
University (“LSU”), who was on the verge of promotion to full professor when she was summarily 
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suspended by her dean, pending an investigation of “serious concerns” that had been raised about 
her “inappropriate statements” to her students. In May 2014, LSU’s Office of Human Resource 
Management (“OHRM”) found Buchanan guilty of sexual harassment based solely on her 
occasional use of profanity and sexually explicit language with her students. Buchanan’s dean 
recommended her dismissal, and has stated that he did not condone “any practices where sexual 
language and profanity are used educating students.” Subsequently, a faculty hearing committee 
recommended unanimously against dismissal of Professor Buchanan, and instead recommended 
that she be censured. Despite this recommendation, the university president recommended 
Professor Buchanan’s dismissal to LSU’s Board of Supervisors, which terminated her in June of 
2015. 
 Professor Buchanan filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana, and argued that the termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech, that 
LSU’s sexual harassment policy violated her First Amendment rights because it was vague and 
overbroad both facially and as applied in her case, and that her due process rights were 
violated.  The District Court ruled against Professor Buchanan, finding that that LSU’s sexual 
harassment policy was constitutional, and that she was afforded procedural and substantive due 
process. Professor Buchanan appealed the court’s ruling that the sexual harassment policy, both 
facially and as applied, was constitutional, and the AAUP filed an amicus brief in support of her 
appeal. 
 In its ruling the Court of Appeals explained the overall standard applied to speech in college 
classrooms.  
 
The Supreme Court has established that academic freedom is “a special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom.” Accordingly, “classroom discussion is protected activity.” 
However, even this protection has limits: Students, teachers, and professors are not 
permitted to say anything and everything simply because the words are uttered in 
the classroom context. 
In order to receive First Amendment protection, classroom speech must involve a “matter of public 
concern.” “This court has held that, in the college classroom context, speech that does not serve 
an academic purpose is not of public concern.” In ruling that Buchanan’s speech was not protected, 
the court found “that Dr. Buchanan’s use of profanity and discussion of her sex life and the sex 
lives of her students was not related to the subject matter or purpose of training Pre-K–Third grade 
teachers.” Since the court found that Buchanan’s speech was not protected, it held that her 
termination did not violate the First Amendment. The court also dismissed Buchanan’s claims that 
the harassment policy was unconstitutional as it found that Buchanan had not sued to proper party 
for this claim. Therefore, the court did not address the substantive arguments regarding the 
constitutionality of the policy.  
8
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The AAUP filed an amicus brief, written primarily by Risa Lieberwitz with contributions 
from Aaron Nisenson and Nancy Long, which argues that the termination of Professor Teresa 
Buchanan, for making statements in the classroom that the university improperly characterized as 
sexual harassment, violated her academic freedom. The brief explains that sexual harassment 
policies, particularly those focused on speech, must be narrowly drawn and sufficiently precise to 
ensure that their provisions do not infringe on free speech and academic freedom. In public 
universities, these policies must meet constitutional standards under the First Amendment. AAUP 
argues that the university’s policies, and their application to the facts, failed this test and thus 
violated Professor Buchanan’s academic freedom.  
The AAUP amicus brief emphasizes the importance of faculty being able to use 
controversial language and ideas to challenge students in the classroom.   
   
  The use of provocative ideas and language to engage students, and to enliven  
  the learning process, is well within the scope of academic freedom protected  
  by the First Amendment. Many things a professor says to his or her students  
  may “offend” or even “intimidate” some among them. If every such statement  
  could lead to formal sanctions, and possibly even loss of employment, the   
  pursuit of knowledge and the testing of ideas in the college classroom would  
  be profoundly chilled.  
  
 The brief also recognizes the importance of combatting sexual harassment, and explains 
that these two goals are not in contradiction, but can instead be mutually achieved. “To achieve 
these dual goals, hostile environment policies, particularly those focused on speech alone, must be 
narrowly drawn and sufficiently precise to ensure that their provisions do not infringe on First 
Amendment rights of free speech and academic freedom.” Finally the brief argues that to 
distinguish unprotected harassing speech from constitutionally protected speech under the First 
Amendment, policies allowing discipline for sexual harassment based solely on speech must 
include a showing that the speech was so “severe or pervasive” that it created a hostile 
environment.  
 
EXECUTIVE ORDER, Improving Free Inquiry, Transparency, and Accountability at 
Colleges and Universities (D. Trump March 21, 2019) 
 On March 21, 2019, President Trump issued an Executive Order entitled “Improving Free 
Inquiry, Transparency, and Accountability at Colleges and Universities.” While the President had 
made statements regarding higher education that were highly charged, the Executive Order itself 
was extremely thin.  In its purpose section the Order states:   
[My] Administration seeks to promote free and open debate on college and 
university campuses. Free inquiry is an essential feature of our Nation's democracy, 
9
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and it promotes learning, scientific discovery, and economic prosperity. We must 
encourage institutions to appropriately account for this bedrock principle in their 
administration of student life and to avoid creating environments that stifle 
competing perspectives, thereby potentially impeding beneficial research and 
undermining learning. 
The Executive Order’s provisions addressing free speech and “free inquiry” were very brief 
and unspecific.  
Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the Federal Government to: (a) encourage 
institutions to foster environments that promote open, intellectually engaging, and 
diverse debate, including through compliance with the First Amendment for public 
institutions and compliance with stated institutional policies regarding freedom of 
speech for private institutions; . . .  
Sec. 3. Improving Free Inquiry on Campus. (a) To advance the policy described in 
subsection 2(a) of this Order, the heads of covered agencies shall, in coordination 
with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, take appropriate steps, 
in a manner consistent with applicable law, including the First Amendment, to 
ensure institutions that receive Federal research or education grants promote free 
inquiry, including through compliance with all applicable Federal laws, regulations, 
and policies. 
As AAUP has noted, “the executive order itself is a solution in search of a problem--as the 
order notes, colleges and universities already have policies protecting free expression on campus, 
and, in the case of public institutions, are bound by the First Amendment. Given the vague nature 
of the order, much depends on implementation. It remains to be seen if the executive order, in 
allowing cabinet agencies to draw up their own guidelines that could outline what the 
administration considers noncompliance, will have an impact on federal research and education 
grants.” 
 
C. Union Speech 
 
Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. College, 770 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2014), and No. 13 C 
7950 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016)  
This case arose from the termination of Robin Meade, an adjunct professor and active union 
officer at Moraine Valley Community College, who was summarily dismissed after she sent a 
letter criticizing her college’s treatment of its adjunct faculty. The case resulted in several 
substantive decisions from the district court and one from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 
In the appeals court case, the Seventh Circuit greatly enhanced constitutional protection for 
10
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outspoken critics of public college and university administrators. It reinforced and enhanced recent 
decisions in two other federal circuits in cases from Washington (Demers) and North 
Carolina (Adams). The court specifically relied on a sympathetic interpretation of the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the Garcetti case, expressly invoking the justices’ “reservation” of free speech 
and press protections for academic speakers and writers. The three-judge panel 
unanimously declared that an Illinois community college could not summarily dismiss an adjunct 
teacher for writing a letter criticizing the administration, at least as long as the issues she had raised 
publicly and visibly constituted “matters of public concern.” (See Legal Update, July 2016 for 
further discussion.) 
The federal appeals court also noted that even a contingent or part-time teacher had a 
reasonable expectation of continuing employment at the institution and therefore a protected 
property interest. The appellate court ruled that Robin Meade, the outspoken critic and active 
union officer, was “not alone in expressing concern about the treatment of adjuncts.” The panel 
added that “colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage and 
criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty.” In this regard, the court broke important 
new ground not only with regard to academic freedom and professorial free expression, but even 
more strikingly in its novel embrace of the needs and interests of adjuncts and part-timers. 
On remand, the district court initially denied motions for summary judgment by both the College 
and Meade. 168 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Ill. March 3, 2016). However, on October 17, 2016 in an 
unpublished decision the district court vacated this ruling, granted Plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment, and denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Meade v. Moraine 
Valley Community College, No. 13 C 7950 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2016). The court ruled in Meade’s 
favor on both First Amendment and Due Process grounds. After this decision was issued 
Moraine settled with Professor Meade. 
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015) and 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1100 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2016)  
In this case, a U.S. District in Massachusetts ruled that speech made by a teacher as a union 
representative was protected under the First Amendment. Jennifer was discharged because she sent 
an email to approximately sixty other teachers in which she urged them to enter an "abstain" vote 
on the ballots used in an accreditation process as a means of putting the accreditation process on 
hold and using it to gain leverage in the collective bargaining negotiations. The Court found that 
the Garcetti test did not apply because speech was not a part of her normal employment duties as 
clarified in Lane v. Franks. The court also found that the value of Meagher's speech outweighed 
any interest that the defendants had in preventing unnecessary disruptions and inefficiencies in the 
workplace. Therefore, the court found that Meagher’s speech was protected and that her 
termination violated her rights under the First Amendment. (See Legal Update, July 2016 for 
further discussion.) 
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D. Exclusive Representation  
 
Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Organization, 212.L.R.R.M.3144, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
165951 (Sept. 27, 2018)(US Supreme Court Case 18-719); Bierman, et. al., v. Tim Walz, 
Governor of Minnesota, et. al, 900 F. 3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018) (US Supreme Court Case 
18-766) 
 
There currently two cases presenting challenges to “exclusive representation” currently 
have pending petitions for writ of certiorari at the US Supreme Court, and numerous other cases 
are pending at the lower courts. The first case at the Supreme Court is Uradnik v. Inter Faculty 
Organization, 212.L.R.R.M.3144, 2018 WL 4654751 (Sept. 27, 2018). Petitioner, Dr. Kathleen 
Uradnik, is a professor of political science at St. Cloud State University, a public university that is 
part of the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities. Pursuant to Minnesota law, the Board of 
Trustees of the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (the “Board”) has recognized the Inter 
Faculty Organization (the “Union”) as “the exclusive bargaining representative” for “all faculty 
members.” Their collective bargaining agreement provides, in a section titled “Exclusive Right,” 
that “[t]he Employer will not meet and negotiate relative to those terms and conditions of 
employment subject to negotiations with any employee groups or organizations composed of 
employees covered by this Agreement except through the [Union].” In addition, for “professional 
employees” like teachers and professors, a public employer must also regularly negotiate with the 
union (or its representatives) in “meet and confer” sessions over “matters that are not terms and 
conditions of employment.” 
Dr. Uradnik disagrees with the Union’s positions and advocacy on many issues, including 
issues related to terms and conditions of employment and to governance of the University, and for 
that reason has refused to join it as a member. Nonetheless, because she is employed on the faculty 
of St. Cloud State University, Minnesota law recognizes the Union as her “representative” that 
speaks “on behalf” of her.  
 On July 6, 2018, Dr. Uradnik filed a complaint challenging the compelled-representation 
regime maintained by the Respondents, alleging that it violates her rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to be free from compelled speech and compelled association. She then 
moved for a preliminary injunction which was denied by the district court. While that motion was 
pending, the Eighth Circuit decided Bierman, supra.  Faced with recent Eighth Circuit precedent 
upholding Minnesota’s exclusive representation regime, as well as a subsequent order in that case 
denying en banc review, Dr. Uradnik conceded that her claims were controlled by Bierman and 
moved the appeals court for summary affirmance, so that she could obtain prompt relief from a 
court that could decide the issue. The Respondents did not oppose the motion and the Eighth 
Circuit summarily affirmed the district court on December 3, 2018. On December 4, 2018 
Petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the US Supreme Court. On January 25, 2019, 
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the Court requested that Respondents file responses to the petition. Reponses are due March 27, 
2019.  
 The second case is Bierman, et. al., v. Tim Walz, Governor of Minnesota, et. al, 900 F. 3d 
570 (8th Cir. 2018) (US Supreme Court Case 18-766). The appeals court rejected the petitioner’s 
claim challenging the State’s recognition of an exclusive representative as violating their 
association rights. It held that, under this court’s decision the “Minnesota State Board for 
Community Colleges v. Knight,” 465 U.S. 274 (1984), a governments “recognizing an” exclusive 
negotiating representative “for public worker does not impinge on the right of association”, and in 
this case, Petitioners filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on December 13, 2018 challenging 
Minnesota’s Representation Act, which vests a representative with legal authority to negotiate and 
contract for providers with the State over various Medicaid policies. Responses are due April 3, 
2019.  
 
E. Agency Fee 
 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) 
 On June 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court overruled a 41 year precedent, Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and held that it is unconstitutional to collect 
fees for representational work from non-union members without their voluntary consent. As the 
AAUP argued in an amicus brief filed with the National Education Association (NEA), for over 
four decades the Court had repeatedly found constitutional the agency fee system under which 
unions could charge an agency fee to public employees represented by those unions but who don’t 
want to be union members. This system was applied in 22 states and across thousands of labor 
agreements covering millions of employees.  The majority’s decision (written by Justice Alito) 
overturned this precedent on the theory that collection of agency fees from non-members “violates 
the free speech rights of non-members by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters 
of substantial public concern.” The court did not delay the effective date of its decision and 
therefore public unions and employers generally cannot collect agency fees from non-members 
after June 27, 2018. The court did recognize that certain fees could be collected from non-members 
but only if the non-member “clearly and affirmatively consents before any money is taken from 
them.”    
 The Janus decision arose as a result of a long term campaign by anti-union groups to get 
rid of agency fees and discourage union membership as part of their avowed goal to “deal a mortal 
blow” to unions. Under Abood public sector unions could charge agency fees to non-union 
members for the cost of the union negotiating and enforcing a collective bargaining agreement 
covering those individuals. Over the last forty years, the courts have repeatedly found that the 
agency fee system adequately balances the interests of the employees and the state in an efficient 
labor relations system and the First Amendment interests of union members and nonmembers. 
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However, in a 2014 decision, Harris v. Quinn, Justice Samuel Alito questioned whether Abood 
was good law and virtually invited challenges to the constitutionality of fair share fees.  
 Janus was one such challenge. It started with a lawsuit filed in Illinois and funded by the 
National Right to Work Committee. The lower courts summarily ruled against the plaintiffs relying 
on the forty year precedent of Abood. The plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, which 
accepted the case in September 2017. The AAUP joined with the National Education Association 
in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court in January 2018. The amicus brief argued that 
Abood should be upheld because the court’s historical interpretation of the First Amendment gives 
the government, in its role as employer, significant authority to manage the public sector 
workplace. Where state laws provide for public sector unionization, public employers have strong 
interests in ensuring robust and effective collective bargaining, including agency fees as a fair and 
equitable way to distribute the costs of collective bargaining among all the employees who benefit.  
 However, the conservative majority in Janus rejected the argument that Abood should be 
upheld.  In previous rulings, Justice Alito made no secret of his contempt for Abood. He devotes 
most of Janus to attacking what has been foundational First Amendment precedent for 41 years. 
He quotes himself as having termed Abood “something of an anomaly” in 2012 and “questionable 
on several grounds” in 2014, and says in Janus that “Abood went wrong at the start.” As Justice 
Elena Kagan ably demonstrates in her dissenting opinion, the decision to overrule Abood cannot 
be defended in terms of First Amendment analysis. Rather, it is nothing more than a political 
decision that “prevents the American people, acting through their state and local officials, from 
making important choices about workplace governance.” “The First Amendment was meant for 
better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance—including over 
the role of public-sector unions.”  
 Nonetheless, Alito found that the imposition of agency fees “violates the free speech rights 
of non-members by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public 
concern.” Alito concluded that agency fees violate the First Amendment because they require non-
members to subsidize union speech, even if they disagree with the message. The Court also ruled 
that avoiding the risk of “free riders” is not a compelling state interest and free rider arguments 
“are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.” 
However, the Janus decision was limited to the issue of whether non-members could be 
compelled to pay agency fees. The majority stated “we are not in any way questioning the 
foundations of modern labor law.”  Thus, Janus did not hold that the First Amendment is violated 
by collective bargaining through an exclusive employee representative.  While the majority 
decision raised issues with the concept of exclusive recognition, it explicitly stated that “It is also 
not disputed that the State may require that a union serve as exclusive bargaining agent for its 
employees.”  Further, the Janus ruling clearly does not extend to unions in the private sector.  For 
example, the Janus opinion severely criticizes Abood’s “fail[ure] to appreciate that a very different 
First Amendment question arises when a State requires its employees to pay agency fees” than 
arises from “Congress’s ‘bare authorization’ of private-sector union shops under the Railway 
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Labor Act.” In this regard, Janus says it is “questionable” whether “any First Amendment issue 
could have properly arisen” from “Congress’s enactment of a provision allowing, but not requiring, 
private parties to enter into union-shop arrangements.” 
 Even the conservative majority recognized that its ruling would generally not invalidate 
other provisions in collective bargaining agreements or state law. The court explicitly stated that 
“States can keep their labor-relations systems exactly as they are—only they cannot force non-
members to subsidize public-sector unions.” And that generally if an agency provision “of a 
collective-bargaining agreement is found to be unlawful, the remaining provisions are likely to 
remain in effect.” In addition, the majority did allow that some monies or fees could be collected 
from non-members in limited circumstances, for example it posited that “individual non-members 
could be required to pay for [union representation in the non-members personal grievance] or could 
be denied union representation altogether [in a personal grievance]” and that non-members could 
voluntarily and affirmatively agree to pay a fee to the union.  However, there are high standards 
for collecting fees under these options, which most current agency fee systems likely would not 
meet.  
 
Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 72 (2d Cir. 2016) cert. denied (Feb. 27, 2017); 
Danielson v. AFSCME, Council 28, AFL-CIO, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1083 (W.D. 
Wash. 2018) and other cases 
 This case addressed an issue that has heightened importance given the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Janus, namely whether unions are required to refund of agency fees collected from non-
union members who were partial public employees under the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris 
v. Quinn, 189 L. Ed. 2d 620 (U.S. 2014).  The plaintiffs were individuals operating home child 
care businesses. They are covered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris which ruled that 
collection of agency fees from these individuals violated to the First Amendment.  
After the Harris decision was issued, the Union and the employer negotiated a new 
collective bargaining agreement that did not require the deduction of agency fees. The union also 
rebated to the plaintiff’s agency fees that were collected after the Supreme Court issued its decision 
in Harris. The plaintiffs continued to prosecute their suit arguing that the Union was obligated to 
rebate them for agency fees paid prior to the Court’s decision in Harris.  
The federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Union was not obligated to 
make such a reimbursement as the union relied in good faith on the law at the time (the “good faith 
defense”) when it collected the agency fees prior to Harris. The Court explained, “In obtaining the 
challenged fair share fees from plaintiffs, CSEA relied on a validly enacted state law and the 
controlling weight of Supreme Court precedent. Because it was objectively reasonable for CSEA 
"to act on the basis of a statute not yet held invalid," defendants are not liable for damages 
stemming from the pre-Harris collection of fair share fees.” Jarvis v. Cuomo, 660 Fed. Appx. 
72 *76, (2d Cir. N.Y. 2016).   
15
Nisenson: Panel: Legal Issues in Higher Education: Annual Review of Court a
Published by The Keep, 2019
16 
 
District courts considering claims that unions’ owed repayments for agency fees that 
were legally collected prior to Janus, have applied the good faith defense and rejected these 
claims. Danielson v. AFSCME, Council 28, AFL-CIO, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1083 (W.D. Wash. 
2018); Cook v. Brown, No. 6:18-cv-01085-AA, 2019 WL 982384 (D. Ore. Feb. 28, 2019); Carey 
v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05208-RBL, 2019 WL 1115259, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2019); 
Crocket v. NEA Alaska, 3:18-cv-00179-JWS, 2019 WL 1212082, at *12 (D. Alaska, Mar. 14. 
2019); Janus v. AFSCME, 15-C-1235 (N.D. Ill. March 18, 2019). Similarly, several district 
courts rejected claims for payment of agency fees collected for services performed before the 
Harris decision was issued on June 30, 2014. Winner v. Rauner, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175925 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016); Hoffman v. Inslee, No. 14-CV-200 (MJP), 2016 WL 6126016, at *5 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2016). 
 
III. Academic Freedom 
 
Glass v. Paxton, 900 F. 3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018) 
 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas law permitting the concealed 
carry of handguns on campus (the “campus carry law”) and a corresponding University of Texas 
at Austin (UT) policy prohibiting professors from banning such weapons in their classrooms. 
Faculty from UT filed suit and argued that the law and policy violated the First Amendment, 
Second Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lower court 
dismissed the faculty’s claims and the faculty appealed. In its amicus brief, the AAUP argued that 
the law and policy requiring that handguns be permitted in classrooms harms faculty as it deprives 
them of a core academic decision and chills their First Amendment right to academic freedom. 
The appeals court rejected the faculty’s claims finding that they lacked standing under the First 
Amendment as it deemed that the harm was not certainly impending. The court also affirmed the 
dismissal of the Second Amendment and Equal Protection claims. 
This case arose from an appeal of a lawsuit filed by several UT faculty contesting a policy 
that had been promulgated as a result of the campus carry law that expressly permits concealed 
handguns on university campuses. In 2016, UT issued a Campus Carry Policy mandating that 
faculty permit concealed handguns in their classrooms. In their lawsuit before the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas, the faculty alleged that enforcement of the Campus 
Carry Policy profoundly changes the educational environment in which plaintiffs teach in violation 
of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the faculty failed to 
establish an injury-in-fact or that the alleged injury was traceable to any conduct of defendants. 
The court stated that the faculty cannot “establish standing by ‘simply claiming that they 
experienced a “chilling effect” that resulted from a governmental policy that does not regulate, 
constrain, or compel any action on their part.’”  (Order at 4 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1153 (2013).)  It concluded that the faculty asked the court to find standing 
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based only on “their self-imposed censoring of classroom discussions caused by their fear of the 
possibility of illegal activity by persons not joined in this lawsuit.”  (Order at 6). The faculty 
challenged the district court’s holding and also argued that because the district court failed to 
provide any reasoning for the dismissal of their Second and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the 
federal appeals court should consider the merits of these claims. 
In its amicus brief in support of the faculty the AAUP joined with the Giffords Law Center 
to Prevent Gun Violence and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence and focused on the 
faculty’s First Amendment claim and argued that the law and policy infringed on the faculty’s 
academic freedom by creating an imminent cognizable injury that is neither hypothetic not 
speculative. The brief explained that the deleterious impact of guns on education is widely 
recognized by university administrators and faculty, whose conclusions are confirmed by a 
significant body of social science research. The brief also argued that the “decision whether to 
permit or exclude handguns in a given classroom is, at bottom, a decision about educational policy 
and pedagogical strategy. It predictably affects not only the choice of course materials, but how a 
particular professor can and should interact with her students—how far she should press a student 
or a class to wrestle with unsettling ideas, how trenchantly and forthrightly she can evaluate student 
work. Permitting handguns in the classroom also affects the extent to which faculty can or should 
prompt students to challenge each other. The law and policy thus implicate concerns at the very 
core of academic freedom: They compel faculty to alter their pedagogical choices, deprive them 
of the decision to exclude guns from their classrooms, and censor their protected speech.”  
In August 2018, the federal appeals court upheld the district court’s ruling. On the First 
Amendment “standing” issue, the court determined that the faculty lacked standing because they 
could not show whether the harm threatened by the concealed-carrying students was “certainly 
impending.” “Because she [Plaintiffs] fails to allege certainty as to how these students will exercise 
their future judgment, the alleged harm is certainly not impending.” The court also rejected the 
faculty’s Second and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court rejected the faculty’s interpretation 
of the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause and found that it cannot “limit or expand the scope” 
of an individual right. Finally, the court rejected the faculty’s claim that the law and policy violated 
their rights under the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment because the 
faculty failed to meet its burden to establish that the law and policy lacked a rational basis.    
 
McAdams v. Marquette University, 383 Wisc. 2d 358, 914 N.W.2d 708 (2018) 
  In one of the best decisions on academic freedom in decades, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, citing AAUP polices and an amicus brief filed by the AAUP, ruled that Marquette 
University wrongly disciplined Dr. John McAdams for comments he made on his personal blog in 
2014. Dr. McAdams criticized a graduate teaching instructor by name for her refusal to allow a 
student to debate gay rights because "everybody agrees on this." The blog was publicized in the 
national press, and the instructor received numerous harassing communications from third parties.  
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Marquette suspended Dr. McAdams, and demanded an apology as a condition of reinstatement. 
Relying heavily on AAUP’s standards and principles on academic freedom, as detailed in AAUP’s 
amicus brief, the court held that “the University breached its contract with Dr. McAdams when it 
suspended him for engaging in activity protected by the contract's guarantee of academic freedom."  
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded this case with instructions that the lower court enter 
judgment in favor of Dr. McAdams and determine damages, and it ordered Marquette to 
immediately reinstate Dr. McAdams with unimpaired rank, tenure, compensation, and benefits. 
 In late 2014, Dr. McAdams, a tenured professor at Marquette University, published a blog 
post on his personal blog, which criticized Cheryl Abbate, a graduate student and philosophy 
instructor, on the way she handled a student’s question on a potential controversial topic during 
one of her philosophy classes. The blog post was picked up by the national media, and Ms. Abate 
received numerous harassing and offensive emails and other communications. In December 16, 
2014, Dr. McAdams was suspended with pay and banned from campus. On January 26, 2015, the 
AAUP Department of Academic Freedom, Tenure, and Governance sent a letter to the University 
President informing him that the suspension appeared to violate AAUP policies.  
On January 30, 2015, Marquette formally notified Dr. McAdams that it was commencing 
the process to revoke his tenure and terminate his employment.  Per Marquette’s Faculty Statutes 
the matter was referred to a Faculty Hearing Committee (“FHC”). The FHC concluded “that the 
suspension of Dr. McAdams pending the outcome of this proceeding, imposed by the University 
with no faculty review and in the absence of any viable threat posed by the continuation of his job 
duties, was an abuse of the University’s discretion granted under the Faculty Statutes.” The FHC 
further concluded there was not sufficient cause for Marquette to terminate Dr. McAdams, but that 
he could be suspended for up to two semesters without pay.   
On March 24, 2016, President Lovell advised Dr. McAdams that he was to be suspended 
without pay for two semesters, as the FHC had recommended. The President went beyond the FHC 
recommendation, and demanded that as a condition of his reinstatement to the faculty, Dr. 
McAdams provide him (and Ms.  Abbate) with a written statement  expressing “deep regret” and 
admitting  that  his  blog  post  was  “reckless  and  incompatible  with  the  mission  and  values  
of  Marquette University.”  By letter dated April 4, 2016, McAdams advised President Lovell that  
he  would  not  say  what  he  did  not  believe  to  be  true,  and  that  Lovell  was  exceeding  his 
authority  under  the  Faculty  Statutes  by  demanding  that  he  do  so.   As a result, McAdams 
was not reinstated to the faculty at the end of his two semester suspension and was effectively 
fired.  
 Dr. McAdams brought suit and claimed, inter alia, that Marquette violated his due process 
rights under the contract and his right to academic freedom. The court granted Marquette’s motion 
for summary judgment and found that Dr. McAdams “expressly agreed as a condition of his 
employment to abide by the disciplinary procedure set forth in the Faculty Statutes, incorporated 
by reference into his contract” and that Marquette substantially compiled with these procedures. 
On the academic freedom claim, the court opined, “In short, academic freedom gives a professor, 
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such a Dr. McAdams, the right to express his view in speeches, writing and on the internet, so long 
as he does not infringe on the rights of others.” Dr. McAdams appealed the trial court’s 
decision.  On January 22, 2018, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed to bypass the Court of 
Appeals, and to hear the case immediately. 
 AAUP submitted an amicus brief to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which explained that 
“Such a formulation of limiting academic freedom to ‘views’ that do ‘not infringe on the rights of 
others’ vastly undermines academic freedom. The nature of offering opinions, particularly 
controversial ones, is that they may prompt vigorous responses, including assertions that the right 
of others have been infringed. Views and opinions should be subject to debate, not to limitations 
based on claims that the expression of views infringes upon the rights of others. Adding such a 
component will only serve to limit the openness and breadth of the views expressed in academia, 
compromising essential rights of academic freedom.” The amicus brief urged the court to adopt 
AAUP standards to interpret academic freedom policies, including those at Marquette, as 
protecting faculty from discipline for extramural speech unless the university administration 
proves that such speech clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness to serve, taking into 
account his entire record as a teacher and scholar. As AAUP standards explain, “Extramural 
utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s fitness for continuing service.” The amicus brief 
also argued that Marquette violated Dr. McAdams’s due process rights by unilaterally imposing a 
new penalty that required Dr. McAdams to write a statement of apology/admission as a condition 
of reinstatement. This severe sanction would compel Dr. McAdams to renounce his opinions, a 
fundamental violation of his academic freedom. It also amounted to a de facto termination that 
was imposed in contravention of the Faculty Hearing Committee’s recommended lesser penalty. 
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that it would decide this case on the merits. As 
an initial matter, the court declined to defer to the university’s decision. One important reason was 
that the faculty hearing committee’s decision was only advisory and not binding on the 
administration. The court stated, “The Discipline Procedure produced advice [from the FMC], not 
a decision. We do not defer to advice.” In addition, the court noted there were no rules for the 
President on appeal, stating “The Discipline Procedure is silent with respect to how the president 
must proceed after receiving the report.” And “once it reached the actual decision-maker (President 
Lovell), there were no procedures to govern the decision-making process.” The lack of procedures 
governing appeals to the President was one area in which the Marquette’s grievance procedure did 
not track AAUP’s Recommended Institutional Regulations.  
In its analysis of the merits of Dr. McAdams’s academic freedom argument, the court 
specifically cited to the AAUP’s standards and principles as outlined in our amicus brief. The court 
stated: “The University acknowledges this definition (of academic freedom) came from the 
American Association of University Professors’ 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure. During their arguments, both the University and Dr. McAdams had recourse 
to that document, as well as to subsequent AAUP-authored, explanatory documents such as the 
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1970 Interpretive Comments. Consequently, we will refer to those sources as necessary to 
understand the scope of the academic freedom doctrine.”(Emphasis added.) 
 Relying on AAUP’s standards and principles, the court determined that Dr. McAdam’s 
blog post was an “extramural comment,” a type of expression made in Dr. McAdams’ personal 
not professional, capacity. In the next step of its analysis, the court adopted the AAUP’s “analytical 
structure” to analyze the impact of the blog post—the controlling principle, the court noted, is that 
a “faculty member’s expression of opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal 
unless it clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her position. If the comment 
meets this standard, the second part of this analysis considers the broader context of the faculty 
member’s complete record before deciding whether the extramural comment is protected by the 
doctrine of academic freedom: ‘[A] final decision should take into account the faculty member’s 
entire record as a teacher and scholar.’” quoting from AAUP’s 1940 Statement of Principles of 
Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments and Committee A Statement of 
Extramural Utterances. Marquette failed to follow these long standing AAUP standards and 
principles.  
 The court further touted AAUP’s standards and principles---“The AAUP properly limits 
the analysis to whether the actual extramural comment, on its face, clearly demonstrates that the 
professor is unfit to serve. This very narrow inquiry explains why the AAUP can confidently state 
that ‘[e]xtramural utterances rarely bear upon the faculty member’s fitness for a particular positon.’ 
If we adopted the alternative structure now favored by the University, academic freedom would 
be nothing but a subjective, post-hoc analysis of what the institution might find unacceptable after 
watching how events unfolded. And this would likely chill extramural comments to the point of 
extinction. It would be a fearless professor indeed who would risk such a comment, knowing that 
it licenses the University to scrutinize his entire career and assay it against the care of ‘all aspects 
of the lives of the members of the institution.’” Ultimately, Justice Daniel Kelly concluded 
“McAdams's blog post qualifies as an extramural comment protected by the doctrine of academic 
freedom.” “The post is incapable of clearly demonstrating McAdams is unfit to serve as a professor 
because, although the university identified many aspects of the blog post about which it was 
concerned, it did not identify any particular way in which the blog post violated McAdams' 
responsibilities to the institution's students.” 
 
City & Cty.of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F. 3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) 
 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared unconstitutional the Trump 
administration's executive order withholding federal funds from sanctuary cities and counties. The 
AAUP joined an amicus brief opposing the executive order and supporting a permanent injunction 
preventing its enforcement. The appeals court held that under the principle of Separation of Powers 
and in consideration of the Spending Clause, which vests exclusive power to Congress to impose 
conditions on federal grants, the executive branch may not refuse to disperse the federal grants in 
question without congressional authorization. Because Congress has not acted, the panel affirmed 
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the district court’s decision finding that the Executive Order was unconstitutional. The appeals 
court upheld the permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the order against the city and 
county of San Francisco and in California, but lifted the nationwide injunction and sent the case 
back to the lower court for a more searching inquiry into the need for such relief.   
On January 25, 2017, the Trump administration issued Executive Order 13768 which 
declares that “(i)t is the policy of the executive branch to . . . (e)nsure that jurisdictions that fail to 
comply with applicable Federal law do not receive Federal funds, except as mandated by law.” 
Section 9 implements that policy by commanding executive branch officials to strip state and local 
governments deemed to be “sanctuary jurisdictions” of their eligibility “to receive grants.” The 
City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara filed suit in the US District Court 
for the Northern District of California against President Trump and other federal officials, alleging 
that the executive order violated the separation of powers doctrine, the Tenth Amendment, and 
due process guarantees. 
On April 25, 2017, the district court determined that the city and county of San Francisco 
and county of Santa Clara had pre-enforcement standing to protect hundreds of millions of dollars 
of federal grants from the unconstitutionally broad sweep of the Executive Order. The district court 
entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against the executive order and enjoined the 
defendants-appellants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the executive order as such enforcement 
would continue to cause constitutional injury by violating the Separation of Powers doctrine and 
depriving plaintiffs-appellees of their Tenth and Fifth Amendment rights. 
In February 2018, the AAUP joined with other groups, including members of the California 
Community College System, in filing an amicus brief opposing the executive order and supporting 
a permanent injunction preventing its enforcement. The AAUP’s interest in the case stemmed from 
the potential application of the executive order to colleges and universities. The amicus brief 
argues that such an extension would negatively impact colleges’ and universities’ ability to carry 
out their public mission and their interests in developing a diverse student body. The brief also 
emphasizes the harms caused by the Executive Order—undermining the critical interest that our 
society has in the education of all its residents regardless of immigration status; threatening higher 
education’s constitutional interest in educational independence to create the sort of diverse student 
body that is critical to the intellectual and academic life of the community; devastating university 
research opportunities by withdrawing federal funding for failure to participate in federal 
immigration enforcement; and penalizing students’ opportunities for higher education by 
withdrawing federal student scholarship funding. 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violates the Separation of Powers, 
and that the Administration has not even attempted to show that Congress authorized it to withdraw 
federal grant money from jurisdictions that do not agree with the current Administration’s 
immigration strategies. “Not only has the Administration claimed for itself Congress’s exclusive 
spending power, it has also attempted to coopt Congress’s power to legislate.” Moreover, the 
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president’s authority to act must stem from either an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. 
Neither of which happened in this case.   
From the start of the current administration, AAUP has supported the nationwide sanctuary 
movement in states, cities, and other localities and across college and university campuses.  While 
the court did not directly address college and universities as sanctuary jurisdictions, the decision 
reinforces the argument that the administration cannot cut off federal funding to colleges and 
universities because they are sanctuary campuses. 
 
IV. Public Records/Subpoenas  
 
Energy & Environment Legal Institute v. Arizona Board of Regents, Case No. 2CACV-
2017-0002 (Ariz. App. Ct., Second App. Div., Sept. 14, 2017) (unpublished)  
 In this decision the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected attempts by a “free market” legal 
foundation to use public records requests to compel faculty members to release emails related to 
their climate research. In an amicus brief in support of the scientists, the AAUP had argued that 
Arizona statute creates an exemption to public release of records for academic research records, 
and that a general statutory exemption protecting records when in the best interests of the state, in 
particular the state’s interest in academic freedom, should have been considered. The appeals court 
agreed and reversed the decision of the trial court that required release of the records and returned 
the case to the trial court so that it could address these issues. (See Legal Update, July 2016 for 
further discussion.) 
  
Service Employees International Union Local 925 (“SEIU 925”) v. University of 
Washington, Freedom Foundation, No. 76630-9-1 (Wash. Ct. App. June 11, 2018) 
 In this case, the Court of Appeals in Washington State found that emails to and from a 
faculty member at his University of Washington email address relating to faculty organizing and 
addressing faculty concerns were not “public records” under state law as they were “not within the 
scope of employment, [and] do not relate to the UW’s conduct of government or the performance 
of government function.”  
 This case arose from a public records request by the Freedom Foundation (‘Foundation”) 
to the University of Washington (“UW”) under the State of Washington Public Records Act (the 
“PRA”). The request sought documents from UW Professor Robert Wood (the President of the 
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UW AAUP Chapter1 and a member of SEIU 925), particularly emails sent to and from Professor 
Woods university email address, aaup@u.washington.edu, including records involving faculty 
union organizing; the UW AAUP Chapter; and other personal and private matters (the “Records”).  
 On April 25, 2016, SEIU 925 filed a Complaint seeking a temporary restraining order to 
temporarily enjoin release of the Records. The trial court granted a TRO enjoining UW from 
releasing the Records but required that the “public records” portion of the Records be released by 
July 6, 2016.  SEIU argued that documents in the following categories were not “public records” 
and therefore disclosure was not required or permitted:  (1) emails and documents about faculty 
organizing including emails containing opinions and strategy in regard to faculty organizing and 
direct communication with SEIU 925; (2) postings to AAUP UW Chapter listserve; (3) personal 
emails and/or documents unrelated to any UW business; and (4) personal emails sent or received 
by Professor Wood in his capacity as AAUP UW chapter president and unrelated to UW business 
(the “Non-Public Records”).  SEIU argued that the Non-Public Records were personal and private 
and thus not “public records” under the PRA because they do not relate to the conduct of 
government or a governmental or proprietary function. Following this reasoning, the trial court (in 
March 2017) entered a permanent injunction enjoining release of those because they are not 
“public records” under the PRA. The Foundation filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Washington, Division I (the “Court of Appeals”).  
 The Court of Appeals upheld the permanent injunction issued by the trial court and 
determined that (1) SEIU had standing to seek injunctive relief “as a party to whom public records 
held by a public agency may pertain and under chapter 7.40 RCW as a party whose rights may be 
affected by the release to the public of non-public records.”; and (2) the emails at issue did not 
qualify as public records under the PRA (and therefore do not have to be disclosed) because 
“documents relating to faculty organizing and addressing faculty concerns are not within the scope 
of employment, do not relate to the UW’s conduct of government or the performance of 
government function.” This finding is a great victory--disclosure of the Non-Public Records will 
have a chilling effect on the ability of faculty to freely associate and exchange ideas. This chilling 
effect would come from faculty fearing surveillance of whether they are members of UW AAUP 
or SEIU 925 and of faculty participation in internal SEIU 925 or UW AAUP discussions and 
debates.    
 
                                                 
 
 
1 The Court of Appeals specifically noted that the “UW chapter of the national nonprofit organization, the American 
Association of University Professors, uses the UW e-mail account, aaup@washington.edu. That account operates as 
an email ‘listserver’ and distributes messages to an e-mail subscriber list.”  
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V. Tenure, Due Process, Breach of Contract, and Pay 
 
A. Tenure – Breach of Contract 
 
Sumner v. Simpson University, 27 Cal. App. 5th 577 (Sept. 25, 2018) 
After her employment was terminated Professor Sumner, the dean of a theological 
seminary (that was part of a university) sued the university for breach of contract and other causes 
of action. The trial court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment deciding that even 
though Sumner was not a minister when employed as the dean of Tozer Seminary, the ministerial 
exception nevertheless applied to Sumner, and that all of her causes of action were barred by the 
ministerial exception. The trial court reasoned that Sumner’s claims “are intertwined with the 
employment decision of retaining or terminating Sumner, and all of the grounds for terminating 
her relate to ecclesiastical governance.”  
The Court of Appeal reversed the summary adjudication of the breach of contract claim 
relying on Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary 426 S.W.3d 597, a case from the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky which held that breach of contract actions are not foreclosed by the ministerial 
exception (Id. at p. 601.) The Plaintiff, Kirby, was a tenured professor at Lexington Theological 
Seminary and was terminated for financial reasons, after which he filed an action alleging, inter 
alia, breach of contract. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that because the enforcement of the 
contract did not arouse concerns of government interference in the selection of the school's 
ministers and the contract did not involve matters of ecclesiastical concern. This court further 
stated that as to whether applying the state's contract law would involve excessive government 
entanglement, Kirby's breach of contract claims did not require an inspection or evaluation of 
church doctrine, but merely an application of neutral principles of law. (Kirby, supra, 426 S.W.3d 
at p. 619.)  
The Court of Appeal found that Dean Sumner was a ministerial employee, even if many of 
her duties were administrative in nature because her job requirements included a doctorate in 
ministry, teaching courses in religion, promoting the seminary, including preaching and she was a 
visionary leader. Following the reasoning of Kirby, the Court of Appeal held that Professor 
Sumner’s breach of contract claim was not barred by the ministerial exception because “it would 
not require the court to wade into doctrinal waters.” The Court of Appeal concluded that since 
Defendants has never claimed to have terminated Sumner for religious reasons, only for 
insubordination, they “voluntarily circumscribed their own conduct by entering into the contract 
with Sumner and the contract can be enforceable without breaching the institution’s religious 
autonomy,” citation omitted.   
 
Fagal v. Marywood Univ., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70962 (M.D. Pa. April 27, 2018) 
Plaintiff, Dr. Frederick Fagal, was a tenured faculty member at Defendant, Marywood 
University. Dr. Fagal was suspended and ultimately terminated by Marywood following his 
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development and distribution of two parodies which depicted members of the Marywood 
administration as Nazis. Following his termination, Dr. Fagal filed a complaint alleging a breach 
of contract in that Defendant failed to provide him with the proper process before his suspension 
and ultimate termination.  At trial, the court granted Defendant’s motion for Judgment on Partial 
Findings finding that “no Marywood action resulted in a breach of contract with Dr. Fagal.”  
In analyzing Pennsylvania contract law, the court found that Dr. Fagal failed to meet 
Pennsylvania’s breach of contract rules. In Pennsylvania, "[T]he standard of review for an action 
for breach of a tenure contract is the same as that applicable to a contract between private parties." 
citations omitted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly declined to apply a deferential 
standard of review in contractual disputes between a private university and its professors, citation 
omitted. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also distinguished claims for breach of 
contract contesting the merits of a private university's decision to terminate a tenured professor, 
which are generally unreviewable if the contract exclusively reserves such decisions to the 
university, from claims that allege a university failed to adhere to the procedural protections 
afforded to tenured professors per the terms of their employment contract, which ARE subject to 
judicial scrutiny,” citations omitted. The court here found that Dr. Fagal failed to show that 
Marywood acted (or failed to act) in a manner that supported his breach of contract claim.   
 
Matter of Monaco v. N.Y. Univ., 145 A.D.3d 567, 43 N.Y.S.3d 328 (N.Y. App. Div., 
2016) 
Professors Marie Monaco and Herbert Samuels, New York University Medical School, 
had their salaries significantly slashed after NYU arbitrarily imposed a salary reduction policy. 
(See Legal Update, July 2017 for further discussion.) The Professors believed that this policy 
violated their contracts of employment, as well as NYU’s handbook which, in its definition of 
tenure, “guarantees both freedom of research and economic security and thus prohibits a 
diminution in salary.” NYU argued that it was not even bound by the Faculty Handbook. On 
December 15, 2016, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First 
Department found that Professors Monaco and Samuels sufficiently alleged that the policies 
contained in NYU’s handbook, which “form part of the essential employment understandings 
between a member of the Faculty and the University have the force of contract.”  
 
B. Tenure – Constitutionality  
 
Vergara v. State of Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 619, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. App. 2d 
Dist., May 3, 2016) 
 In this case, the Court of Appeal of California issued a decision overturning a ruling by a 
California state court judge that found that California statutes providing tenure protections to K–
12 teachers violated the equal protection provisions of the California constitution. (See Legal 
Update, July 2017 for further discussion.) The case arose from a challenge, funded by anti-union 
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organizations, to five California statutes that provide primary and secondary school teachers a two-
year probationary period, stipulate procedural protections for non-probationary teachers facing 
termination, and emphasize teacher seniority in reductions of force. The AAUP submitted 
an amicus brief which argued that the challenged statutes help protect teachers from retaliation, 
help keep good teachers in the classroom by promoting teacher longevity and discouraging teacher 
turnover, and allow teachers to act in students’ interests in presenting curricular material and 
advocating for students within the school system. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s 
decision, holding that the statutes themselves did not create equal protection violations, so they are 
not unconstitutional. (See Legal Update, July 2017 for further discussion.) 
  
C. Due Process  
 
 Wilkerson v. Univ. of N. Tex., 878 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2017)  
Plaintiff, a non-tenured professor, had a one-year appointment per a contract that included 
a five-year commitment to renew at the option of the university. Plaintiff was informed by a 
university representative that the renewal provision was only included for the university’s 
convenience and would only be invoked if there was a reduction in workforce that necessitated 
non-renewals. Plaintiff was terminated and alleged that he had a property interest in his continued 
employment. The question before the court was not whether the university was within its right to 
terminate Plaintiff but rather was Plaintiff reasonable in expecting, based on rules and 
expectations, the university to employ him for the fourth year of a five-year contract? The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas followed the reasoning in Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972), and held that Plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of his continued employment based on the university’s assurances and the 
context of his contract that it would exercise its option to renew each year, absent serious violations 
or a reduction in force.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and 
found that the Sindermann case was not dispositive here, as “. . . Sindermann noted that Texas law 
could still bar a teacher’s due process claim.” “Far from inviting Wilkerson ‘to feel that he has 
permanent tenure’”, [citation omitted], his contract provided a one-year appointment, and the 
bylaws and caselaw warned not to expect further ones. . .” The court further noted that the district 
court had overlooked the contract’s integration clause and had put “informal understandings and 
customs” above the university’s officially promulgated position.  
 
McAdams v. Marquette University, 383 Wisc. 2d 358, 914 N.W.2d 708 (2018)  
 This case is discussed in detail above. As explained above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
declined to defer to the university’s decision on the discipline of Dr. McAdams. One important 
reason was that the faculty hearing committee’s decision was only advisory and not binding on the 
administration. The court stated, “The Discipline Procedure produced advice [from the FMC], not 
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a decision. We do not defer to advice.” In addition, the court noted there were no rules for the 
President on appeal, stating “The Discipline Procedure is silent with respect to how the president 
must proceed after receiving the report.” And “once it reached the actual decision-maker (President 
Lovell), there were no procedures to govern the decision-making process.” The lack of a 
procedures governing appeals to the President were one area in which the Marquette’s grievance 
procedure did not track AAUP’s Recommended Institutional Regulations. 
 
D. Faculty Handbooks 
 
Munker v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. Sys., 255 So. 3d 718 (La. App. 
September 19, 2018) 
 Plaintiff, Dr. Reinhold Munker, a tenured professor at Louisiana State University Medical 
Center, filed this lawsuit against Defendant, Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University 
System, alleging that he had been terminated "without prior notice and without cause" and in 
violation of the university’s faculty handbook. He also alleged that, as a tenured professor, he "has 
a property interest in employment protected by the procedural due process provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2 of the Louisiana 
Constitution. Defendants argued that Plaintiff submitted his resignation and voluntarily ended his 
employment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed.   
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that a contract existed between the parties even though 
Louisiana does not recognize policies in a faculty handbook as the basis of a breach of contract 
claim. Since the parties conceded that Plaintiff was a tenured professor, he was no longer an at-
will employee and the university was bound by the terms of the faculty handbook. The court 
opined, “the historical purpose of tenure, which originated in higher education, was the protection 
of academic freedom by preventing arbitrary or repressive dismissal,” citations omitted.   
 
Crosby v. University of Kentucky, 863 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2017) 
 In this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard Crosby, is a tenured Professor and former Department Chair at the 
University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health. He filed suit against the University and several 
University officials under Section 1983 and state law, claiming that his removal as Department 
Chair amounted to a violation of his right to due process. Prior to his removal, the University had 
investigated Plaintiff-Appellant for reports that he was “[v]olatile,” “explosive,” “disrespectful,” 
“condescending,” “out of control,” “prone to angry outbursts,” made an offensive remark about 
women, and that the Department’s performance was suffering because of Plaintiff-Appellant’s 
temper and hostility toward other departments. After being stripped of his Department Chair 
position, Plaintiff-Appellant appealed and demanded that the University handle his appeal under a 
proposed governing regulation not yet adopted by the University. The University declined, and 
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Plaintiff-Appellant filed suit. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Sixth Circuit found 
that Plaintiff-Appellant identified “no statute, formal contract, or contract implied from the 
circumstances that supports his claim to a protected property interest in his position as Chair,” and 
that the individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
Barry v. Trs. of Emmanuel Coll., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20511 (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 
2019) 
Plaintiff Jacqueline Barry brought a lawsuit against Defendant, Trustees of Emmanuel 
College alleging that they breached the terms of the contract that Defendant had with its faculty 
during its review of Plaintiff's application for promotion and tenure. Professor Barry claims that 
Defendant breached its contract with her by failing to follow the tenure process delineated in the 
handbook when reviewing her application. 
The district court found that Plaintiff presented genuine issues of material fact regarding 
her breach of contract claim. Under Massachusetts law, a breach of contract claims requires a 
plaintiff to prove that “she had a binding contract, that the plaintiff was willing and able to perform 
under that contract, that defendant's breach prevented the plaintiff from performing, and that the 
plaintiff suffered damages,” citation omitted. Massachusetts state courts have found that a college's 
faculty handbook may constitute a binding contract between that college and its faculty, citations 
omitted. In this case, Defendant does not dispute that its handbook was a binding contract. In 
interpreting Defendant’s handbook as a contract, the court emphasized that, as a general matter, 
unless there is “arbitrary and capricious conduct” by the university, courts are not to intrude into 
university decision-making. In this case, however, the court determined that when Defendant 
unilaterally modified the terms of its handbook, a genuine issue of fact arose and must be further 
adjudicated.    
 
VI. Discrimination and Affirmative Action  
 
A. Affirmative Action in Admissions 
 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
The US Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of University of Texas at Austin’s 
affirmative action program. In its second consideration of Fisher’s challenge to UT’s program, the 
Court confirmed that universities must prove that race is considered only as necessary to meet the 
permissible goals of affirmative action. In particular, the university must prove that “race-neutral 
alternatives” will not suffice to meet these goals. (See Legal Update, July 2017 for further 
discussion.) 
The Court confirmed that universities must prove that race is considered only as necessary 
to meet the permissible goals of affirmative action. In particular, the university must prove that 
“race-neutral alternatives” will not suffice to meet these goals. This was the most controversial 
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aspect of the Fisher I decision. In Fisher II, though, the Court takes a reasonable approach, finding 
that UT had sufficient evidence that its “Top Ten” admissions policy based on class rank was not 
adequate, by itself, to meet diversity goals. By adding a “holistic” evaluation of applicants who 
were not admitted in the “Top Ten” program, UT was able to consider race as one factor in a 
broader assessment of qualifications.  
The Court noted that the “prospective guidance” of its decision is limited to some extent 
by the particularities of the UT case. Despite this, the Court’s decision does provide important 
guidance to universities concerning the criteria that will be applied in evaluating affirmative action 
programs. The Court also emphasizes that universities have “a continuing obligation” to “engage 
[] in periodic reassessment of the constitutionality, and efficacy, of [their] admissions program[s].” 
While this requires ongoing study and evaluation by universities, the Court’s decision creates a 
significant and positive basis for universities to adopt affirmative action programs that meet 
constitutional requirements. 
   
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard 
Corp.), Case No. 1:2014-CV-14176 (D. Mass.)(pending) 
AAUP joined an amicus brief prepared by the American Council on Education (ACE) (and 
joined by thirty-six higher education organizations) for submission to the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, Boston Division, in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment by Students for Fair Admissions (SAFFA), which challenges Harvard College’s 
admissions policies. For many years, the AAUP has advocated in favor of affirmative action in 
higher education, emphasizing the educational value of diversity, through amicus briefs in 
Supreme Court cases from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in 1978 to Fisher v. 
Texas in 2016, and through AAUP policy. See “Affirmative Action Plans: Recommended 
Procedures for Increasing the Number of Minority Persons and Women on College and University 
Faculties,” AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports, 157-163 (11th ed. 2015). This amicus brief 
argues that “a diverse student body is essential to the educational objectives of colleges and 
universities, and that each institution should be able to exercise its academic judgment to determine 
within broad limits the diversity that will advance its individual mission.” The brief further argues 
that holistic review (of applications) remains a cornerstone for race-conscious admissions because 
it gives each applicant individualized consideration and reduces no one to her race. 
The case arose in 2014 when SFFA filed a lawsuit alleging that Harvard College 
discriminates against Asian-American students in its admissions processes. In its complaint, SFFA 
claims Harvard uses “racially and ethnically discriminatory policies and procedures in 
administering the undergraduate admissions program at Harvard College in violation of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Specifically, the suit alleges Harvard’s use of race in its 
admissions process holds Asian-American applicants to a higher standard, that Harvard engages 
in “racial balancing,” that it uses race as a dominant factor in its admissions decisions, and that it 
overlooks race-neutral alternatives when choosing which students to admit. In response to the 
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claims, Harvard has consistently denied that it has engaged in racial discrimination or suppressed 
the number of Asian-American students. Instead, Harvard says that it reviews every aspect of each 
applicant’s background and experience in order to develop a diverse student body that university 
officials say helps better prepare undergraduates to succeed in a society where working with people 
who have different life experiences, perspectives, and backgrounds is increasingly essential; and 
that this review process comports with federal law and a string of previous US Supreme Court 
rulings. The parties filed pre-trial summary judgment motions and a trial in this case is scheduled 
for mid-October 2018.         
SFFA’s motion for summary judgment, in substance, asks the court to require fundamental 
changes to university admissions processes and to mandate a more mechanical process in which 
educators’ ability to choose which academic and other criteria they wish to use, weigh and apply 
play next to no role. The brief argues that “that shift would undermine the recognized freedom of 
a university to assemble a class that, in the university’s judgment, will best advance that 
university’s particular mission.” In Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), our brief successfully argued 
that the importance of student diversity and its status as a compelling interest could not be seriously 
disputed. The current amicus relies on the US Supreme Court’s analysis set forth in Fisher II—
“Considerable deference is owed to a university in defining. . . intangible characteristics, like 
student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational mission.” 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
The amicus further argues that court should “reject SFFA’s effort to upset decades of Supreme 
Court precedent and permit Harvard College to pursue the version of diversity that best suits their 
mission and goals, including through the limited consideration of race.” 
The amicus also argues that Harvard’s holistic review (of applications) is supported by 
Supreme Court precedent. “Because the holistic review focuses on individual applicants . . . 
consideration of race as one aspect of this process is permissible.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244, 337; Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205. Holistic review does not treat “an applicant’s race or 
ethnicity [as] the defining feature of his or her application.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. Finally, the 
brief argues that the court should reject SFFA’s effort to upset decades of Supreme Court precedent 
that has approved of holistic and individualized admissions processes, “a victory for plaintiff could 
upend this evolved and evolving system. In a nation that is more connected and racially and 
ethnically diverse than ever, such an outcome would deprive many students of the critical benefits 
of campus diversity and thus education they will need as citizens and leaders in the 21st century.” 
 
B. Sexual Misconduct – Title IX  
  
Letter from Office of Civil Rights, US Department of Education, (Sept. 22, 2017)  
In a Dear Colleague Letter issued on September 22, 2017 the Department of Education 
announced its withdrawal of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and the related 2014 "Q&A" 
guidance. The Department also issued a Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct and announced it 
intends to conduct a notice and comment rulemaking process. The 2017 letter and Q&A’s largely 
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revert to the guidance that predated the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, though they offer certain 
specific advice that extends beyond the earlier guidance.  
  
Proposal to Amend Title IX Regulations, US Department of Education (Nov. 16, 
2018) 
On November 16, 2018, the Department of Education issued its highly-anticipated 
proposed regulations governing Title IX and the institutional response to campus sexual 
harassment and sexual violence. The Department of Education explained that “The proposed 
regulations would clarify and modify Title IX regulatory requirements pertaining to the availability 
of remedies for violations, the effect of Constitutional protections, the designation of a coordinator 
to address sex discrimination issues, the dissemination of a nondiscrimination policy, the adoption 
of grievance procedures, and the process to claim a religious exemption. The proposed regulations 
would also specify how recipient schools and institutions covered by Title IX (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as recipients or schools) must respond to incidents of sexual harassment 
consistent with Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimination.” 
On January 28, 2019, AAUP submitted comments in response to a proposal by the US 
Department of Education to amend Title IX regulations concerning sexual harassment. The AAUP 
responded, in particular, to a question posed by the department about “whether there are any unique 
circumstances that apply to processes involving employees.” The AAUP’s comments are directed 
to the unique circumstance of faculty in higher education.  
The proposed regulations ultimately fail to specify the importance of academic freedom 
and shared governance for Title IX proceedings. Moreover, we object to proposed regulations that 
unduly narrow the scope of protections against sexual harassment.  
The AAUP urges the Department of Education to adopt regulations that do the following:  
 Define sexual harassment broadly enough to prohibit conduct that creates a hostile 
environment  
 Protect freedom of speech and, in particular, academic freedom of faculty in teaching and 
research  
 Protect due process in investigations and hearings  
 Endorse shared governance to bring faculty expertise and institutional knowledge into 
developing and implementing policies related to Title IX  
In 2016, the AAUP published The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX. This report urges 
the education department and universities to address and prevent sexual harassment in ways that 
also fully protect academic freedom and due process, and in ways that enhance shared governance 
by faculty and students.  
While some of the Department of Education's proposed regulatory changes technically 
comport with recommendations made in the AAUP’s 2016 report, narrow agreement on a legal 
rule or standard is not indicative of agreement about what counts as inequality and how to redress 
it. The AAUP is committed to abolishing systemic discrimination in higher education. As our 2016 
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report notes, while colleges, universities, and the education department focus on the sexual 
dimensions of sex discrimination, the plain language of Title IX is meant to protect those on 
campus more broadly from unequal access to educational resources, wage disparities, and 
inequitable representation across the university system. To these ends, we again caution against 
the extraction of gender equity from more comprehensive assessments of the bases for inequality—
including race, class, sexuality, disability, and other dimensions of social difference—both on and 
off campus.  
The AAUP encouraged the Department of Education, as well as colleges and universities, 
to take note of the recommendations in our 2016 Title IX report and to work to improve the 
working and learning conditions of all campus constituents. Such improvements should include 
fully committing to interdisciplinary learning on campus by adequately funding gender, feminist, 
and sexuality studies, as well as allied disciplines, as part of an effort to teach about all forms of 
inequality, including inequalities based on race, gender identity, disability, class, geographic 
location, and sexual orientation.  
 
Article: Aaron Nisenson, Constitutional Due Process and Title IX Investigation and 
Appeal Procedures at Colleges and Universities, 120 Penn State Law Review 963 
(Spring 2016) 
Over the last several years, the federal government has been pressing universities and 
colleges to strengthen the processes used for the investigation, discipline, and appeal of sexual 
harassment and assault cases arising under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments. Public 
sector universities and colleges are also obligated to provide to employees and students disciplined 
for sexual harassment or assault procedural protections under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  These disparate legal obligations have led to lawsuits alleging that universities have 
failed to comply with the Due Process Clause when discipline has been instituted as a result of 
Title IX investigations or when instituting discipline. This article provides an overview of 
Constitutional Due Process rights and their application to public sector universities and colleges 
and will review recent judicial decisions addressing these rights in cases arising from 
investigations, discipline and appeals under Title IX.  It also includes recommendations for 
balancing the need to address sexual misconduct on campus with the due process rights of students 
and employees.  
 
C. Discrimination Claims and Due Process 
Courts in the federal Sixth Circuit and in California have been busy producing precedent 
requiring institutions to provide respondents in certain Title IX cases with certain due process 
rights a hearing and an opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.  While nearly these 
cases have all, so far, involved student respondents, it is worth noting that the proposed Title IX 
regulations do not clearly distinguish between respondents who are students and those who are 
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employees.  As such, it is important to be aware of these procedural developments while this area 
of the law is in flux.   
Smock v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196608 (E.D. Mich. 
Nov. 19, 2018)     
Plaintiff Pamela Smock is a tenured Sociology professor at the University of Michigan.  In 
Spring 2016, all three of the graduate students whose work she supervised complained to the Chair 
of the Department of Sociology that she had made inappropriate jokes and had conversations of a 
sexual nature with them.  After an eight-month investigation, the University concluded that, 
although Professor Smock’s conduct had been inappropriate, it had not been severe enough to 
create a hostile environment.  Nevertheless, the matter was reconsidered by her college’s executive 
committee which, after allowing Professor Smock to submit additional documentation for 
consideration.  The committee sanctioned Professor Smock for three years, freezing her salary and 
accrual of and right to use sabbatical.   
When Professor Smock appealed, the appellate board who considered her appeal added a 
number of allegations to the list of charges against her that had not been considered at the initial 
stage.  These allegations did not relate to the allegations of inappropriate joking and conversation 
raised by her graduate students.  The appellate board upheld the initial findings and sanction, a 
decision confirmed by the provost on subsequent appeal. 
Professor Smock sued the University, alleging that it had deprived her of her due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The federal district court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan agreed, finding that while “Plaintiff had many opportunities to be heard in this case ... 
none were meaningful.”  After noting that she had been cleared by the investigation only to be 
effectively re-tried by a committee without any hearing, the court addressed the appeal hearing’s 
two primary due process deficiencies: Professor Smock had not been provided notice of the 
charges against her until midway through the appellate process and she had not been provided the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses presented against her.  
While the first deficiency, failure to provide timely notice, is straightforward, the second 
matter, requiring an institution to provide the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, is 
not.  Explicitly relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Baum, in which the Circuit Court 
held that the University of Michigan violated a respondent student’s procedural due process right 
when it found him responsible for sexual assault without providing him the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him, the Smock court concluded that the University should have 
provided Professor Smock the same opportunity.  On this basis, the court concluded, Professor 
Smock “adequately pled that the University deprived her, without due process, of her 
constitutionally protected interests.”   
 
Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) 
In this case, a student found responsible for various sexual harassment and sexual assault 
conduct violations sued his institution alleging, inter alia, violation of Title IX.  The plaintiff 
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alleged that Miami University discriminated against generally, by creating a hostile learning 
environment, and specifically, by attacking the University’s disciplinary proceedings as biased 
against men.  The district court granted the University’s motion to dismiss and the Sixth Circuit 
reversed in part.  While the Sixth Circuit sided with the University regarding the student’s Title 
IX hostile environment and deliberate indifference claims, it found that the student had sufficiently 
plead an “erroneous outcome” theory of Title IX recovery. 
 The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by recognizing “at least four theories of liability that a 
student who is attacking a university disciplinary proceeding on grounds of gender bias . . . can 
potentially assert under Title IX:” (1) erroneous outcome; (2) selective enforcement; (3) deliberate 
indifference; and (4) archaic assumptions.  The court noted that the student did not assert “archaic 
assumptions” or “selective enforcement” theories and rejected his deliberate indifference theory 
because “to plead sufficiently a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim the misconduct alleged must 
be sexual harassment.”   
 The Sixth Circuit sided with the student, however, regarding his erroneous outcome theory. 
To plead an erroneous outcome theory, the Sixth Circuit found, a plaintiff must allege “(1) facts 
sufficient to case some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceeding and (2) a particularized causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender 
bias.”  The court found that the student alleged the first element by pleading that the University’s 
finding against him overlooked the fact that the complainant had made (at least seemingly) 
contradictory statements about whether she consented to the sexual act which gave rise to the 
respondent’s finding of responsibility.  In order to show the second, the Sixth Circuit found, a 
plaintiff may allege the existence of “statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, 
statements by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-making that also tend to show 
the influence of gender.”   
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the student’s proffered statistical evidence satisfied this 
element.  It so concluding, the Sixth Circuit found that the student had presented evidence that 
every male student accused of sexual misconduct in the Fall 2013 and Spring 2014 semesters was 
found responsible and that “nearly ninety percent of students found responsible for sexual 
misconduct between 2011 and 2014 have male first-names.”  Additionally, the court noted that the 
student submitted an affidavit from an attorney who regularly represented respondents before the 
University’s disciplinary proceedings “describes a pattern of the University pursuing 
investigations concerning male students, but not female students.”  Somewhat surprisingly, the 
Sixth Circuit also considered evidence of governmental enforcement of Title IX and a Title IX 
lawsuit brought by a student who alleged she would not have been assaulted but for the 
University’s inaction as evidence of a causal connection between gender bias and the allegedly 
erroneous outcome.   On this basis, the Sixth Circuit overturned the trial court’s dismissal of the 
student’s Title IX cause of action.  
While this case relates to a student’s disciplinary hearing, it is important as an employment 
matter because the proposed Title IX regulations do not distinguish between respondents who are 
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employees and respondents who are students.  If passed in their proposed form, the regulations 
will likely impose requirements similar to those espoused by the Sixth Circuit in Doe v. Miami 
University on all institutions, even where the respondent is an employee. 
 
Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018) 
 In this case, the Sixth Circuit reiterated its holding in Doe v. University of Cincinnati that 
“if a public university has to choose between competing narratives to resolve a case, the university 
must give the accused student or his agent an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser and adverse 
witnesses in the presence of a neutral fact-finder.”  The plaintiff in Baum alleged that the 
University of Michigan violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution when it 
disciplined him for sexual assault using a single investigator model that did not provide him the 
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.  Treating the case as a straightforward application 
of the principles it enunciated in Doe v. University of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
University of Michigan had violated the student’s due process rights and  
 While largely reiterating its holding in Doe v. University of Cincinnati, the Baum court 
clarified a number of issues left either unresolved or only partially resolved in that decision. First, 
it noted that its holdings do not require institutions to allow respondents to personally cross-
examine adverse witnesses.  Instead, it is sufficient for institutions to “allow the accused student’s 
agent to conduct the cross-examination on his behalf,” noting that cross-examination through an 
agent preserved the twin goals of cross-examination: its adversarial nature and its allowance for 
follow-up questioning. Next, the Baum decision is notable for providing additional clarity 
regarding when witness credibility is of sufficient importance to require an institution to provide 
a respondent student with the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses: respondents have a 
right to cross-examination whenever “credibility is in dispute and material to the outcome.”  That 
is, the institution’s decision need not depend solely, or even primarily, on the credibility of witness 
testimony in order to necessitate providing the opportunity to cross-examine.  Finally, the Baum 
court rejected the University’s argument that the respondent had been provided the opportunity to 
cross-examine the complainant during her deposition in related civil proceedings and that its 
findings should be upheld because the complainant’s testimony in those proceedings was 
consistent with her testimony in its internal proceedings.  The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, 
as it found that “cross-examination for the sake of cross-examination is not what [the student] 
seeks.  Rather, [the student] seeks cross-examination as part of the credibility assessment by the 
university.” (emphasis in original).  Thus, the Sixth Circuit found, the deposition testimony was 
insufficient to satisfy the University’s obligation to provide the respondent with the opportunity to 
cross-examine adverse witnesses.  
 
Doe v. Kegan Allee, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1036 (2019) 
This case arose out of a student’s being found responsible for sexual assault by the 
University of Southern California (“USC”).  USC used a single investigator model to investigate 
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the complaint against the student, make findings of fact, and, in consultation with the Title IX 
coordinator, determines appropriate sanctions.  The plaintiff challenged this process under a 
California law that permits judicial challenges to private administrative proceedings in certain 
circumstances.  Mirroring decisions within the Sixth Circuit applying federal due process rights to 
Title IX proceedings, the California Court of Appeal in Kegan Allee found that where “a student 
faces serious discipline for alleged misconduct, and the credibility of witnesses is central to the 
adjudication of the charge, fundamental fairness requires that the university must at least permit 
cross-examination of adverse witnesses at a hearing in which the witnesses appear in person or by 
some other means before one or more neutral adjudicator(s) with the power independently to judge 
credibility and find facts.”   
    The Court of Appeal’s decision in Kegan Allee marks yet another chapter in the 
development of California law on the topic, which has been trending for the past couple years 
towards mimicking hearing and cross-examination requirements imposed by the Sixth Circuit 
interpreting the federal due process clause in the Title IX context.  The Kegan Allee court was 
quite explicit in doing so, finding that “[f]or practical purposes, common law requirements for a 
fair disciplinary hearing at a private university mirror the due process protections at public 
universities” and explicitly relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Doe v. Baum and Doe v. 
University of Cincinnati.    
 The California Court of Appeal’s decision in Kegan Allee is a harbinger of things to come 
for employers in the higher education space.  The proposed Title IX regulations do not distinguish 
between respondents who are students and those who are employees.  As such, the hearing and 
cross-examination requirements they impose will likely apply to proceedings involving employee 
respondents.  Decisions like Kegan Allee are a kind of window into the future for institutions that 
are accustomed to having more streamlined disciplinary proceedings for employees. 
  
Ollie v. Univ. of Conn., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17624 (D. Conn. Feb. 4, 2019) 
 This dispute arose out of the termination of Kevin Ollie, the former head basketball coach 
for the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) and involved the application of a collective 
bargaining agreement provision to an employee’s right to seek judicial relief for a claim of 
discrimination.  While his union, UConn’s chapter of the American Association of University 
Professors, arbitrated the dispute as a breach of contract pursuant to the collective bargaining 
agreement that governed Ollie’s employment, Ollie sought judicial intervention to preserve his 
rights to bring race discrimination claims against UConn as he feared the statutes of limitations 
would pass while the arbitration was pending.  Ollie worried that, should he timely file a charge 
of discrimination with a government agency (such as Connecticut’s Commission on Human Rights 
and Opportunities or the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), UConn would 
invoke Section 10.3 of the collective bargaining agreement, which empowered UConn to 
discontinue the arbitration if Ollie simultaneously pursued judicial relief.  The district court 
granted UConn’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Ollie’s claim was not ripe for adjudication. 
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 While the court acknowledged that UConn may respond to Ollie’s filing a charge with a 
relevant government agency by invoking Section 10.3, it found that this potential did not render 
the dispute justiciable.  The dispute focused on whether Ollie had suffered an “injury in fact,” as 
required under generally-applicable law on federal subject matter jurisdiction.  Ollie advanced 
three arguments: that UConn’s refusal to agree to not invoke Section 10.3 exerted a chilling effect 
on his filing with a government agency, that Section 10.3 presented a “credible threat” to him and 
caused him to engage in “coerced self-censorship.”  Ollie’s last argument was that his harm was 
“actual or imminent,” as required under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife to establish standing, because the limitations period for some of his discrimination 
claims had already passed, which Ollie blamed on UConn’s refusal to agree to not invoke Section 
10.3.  
 The court rejected each of Ollie’s arguments, finding instead that he needed to wait until 
UConn invoked Section 10.3 to seek judicial redress for any harm that might cause him.  First, it 
found no legal support for applying the chilling effect argument outside of the First Amendment 
context and declined to extend the doctrine to the filing of discrimination charges with 
governmental agencies.  Next, it reasoned that UConn had done nothing to chill Ollie’s recourse 
to filings with governmental agencies and declined to read into UConn’s refusal to agree to not 
invoke Section 10.3 a threat to invoke it.  Finally, it rejected Ollie’s Lujan argument on the ground 
that the threatened harm was neither actual or imminent as the statute of limitations under Title 
VII is not jurisdictional, meaning that Ollie could challenge any UConn statute of limitations 
argument in court on equitable grounds.  As such, the court found that the threatened harm was 
“hypothetical at this stage.”  For these reasons, the district court dismissed Ollie’s complaint for 
injunctive relief.   
 
VII. Immigration  
 
A. Executive Order Banning Immigration 
 
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)  
 On June 26, 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 vote rejected a challenge 
to President Trump’s September 2017 Presidential Proclamation 9645 (Enhancing Vetting 
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or 
other Public-Safety Threats —referred to as the “travel ban”—restricting immigration to the 
United States by citizens of 8 countries, most of which are predominately Muslim. In an opinion 
by Chief Justice Roberts, the majority relied on the national security justifications for the ruling, 
and held that the travel ban is fully consistent with Congress’s Immigration and Nationality Act as 
well as the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in dissent, 
lamented that the court had “blindly” endorsed “a discriminatory policy motivated by animosity 
toward Muslims.” 
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Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (June 26, 2017)(granting 
cert and granting stay in part), 138 S. Ct. 353 (Oct. 10, 2017)(vacating judgement as 
moot) 
 The Supreme Court case arose out of appeals from two lower court decisions addressing 
the travel ban, Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. June 12, 2017) and Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. May 25, 2017). In Hawaii v. Trump, plaintiffs 
brought suit challenging the legality of the travel ban. The federal district court preliminarily 
enjoined the federal government from enforcing certain sections of the travel ban. The government 
appealed, and the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the district court's 
ruling. The Ninth Circuit found that the President exceeded his authority in issuing an order 
excluding nationals of specified countries from entry into the United States since there were no 
adequate findings that entry of excluded nationals would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States, that present vetting standards were inadequate, or that absent improved vetting 
procedures there likely would be harm to the national interests. It also held that the travel ban 
improperly suspended entry of the nationals on the basis of their country of origin, since the travel 
ban in substance operated as a prohibited discriminatory ban on visa issuance on the basis of 
nationality. Finally, it ruled that restricting entry of refugees and decreasing the annual number of 
refugees who could be admitted was improper since there was no showing that the entry of refugees 
was harmful and procedures for setting the annual admission of refugees were disregarded. 
  
 
VIII. Collective Bargaining Cases and Issues – Private Sector 
 
A. NLRB Authority  
 
1. Religiously Affiliated Institutions 
 
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 N.L.R.B. 157 (2014) 
 In this case the National Labor Relations Board published a significant decision expanding 
the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. The Board modified the standards used to 
determine two important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher 
education institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain 
institutions and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious 
activities; and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are excluded from 
protection of the Act. (see infra) However, both holdings may be overturned by a newly constituted 
Board.  
 In its decision the NLRB ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioned for faculty 
members, even though they were employed at a religious institution. The question of whether 
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faculty members in religious institutions are subject to jurisdiction and coverage of the Act has 
long been a significant issue, with the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Catholic Bishop serving 
as the foundation for any analysis. In Pacific Lutheran University (PLU), the Board established a 
two-part test for determining jurisdiction. First, whether “as a threshold matter, [the university] 
holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment”; and if so, then, second, whether 
“it holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating or 
maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.” 
 The employer and its supporters argued that only the threshold question of whether the 
university was a bona fide religious institution was relevant, in which case the Act would not apply 
to any faculty members. The Board responded that this argument “overreaches because it focuses 
solely on the nature of the institution, without considering whether the petitioned-for faculty 
members act in support of the school’s religious mission.” Therefore, the Board established a 
standard that examines whether faculty members play a role in supporting the school’s religious 
environment. 
 In so doing, the Board recognized concerns that inquiry into faculty members’ individual 
duties in religious institutions may involve examining the institution’s religious beliefs, which 
could intrude on the institution’s First Amendment rights. To avoid this issue the new standard 
focuses on what the institution “holds out” with respect to faculty members. The Board explained, 
“We shall decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications 
to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a 
specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.” 
 The Board also found that that faculty must be “held out as performing a specific religious 
function,” such as integrating the institution’s religious teachings into coursework or engaging in 
religious indoctrination (emphasis in original). This would not be satisfied by general statements 
that faculty are to support religious goals, or that they must adhere to an institution’s commitment 
to diversity or academic freedom. Applying this standard, the Board found that while Pacific 
Lutheran University held itself out as providing a religious educational environment, the 
petitioned-for faculty members were not performing a specific religious function. Therefore, the 
Board asserted jurisdiction and turned to the question of whether certain of the faculty members 
were managerial employees.  
However, this holding is very susceptible to reversal by a newly constituted Board, and the 
holding drew dissents from both Republican members of the Board.  The NLRB would not be able 
to modify PLU until one or more cases with these issues come to the Board on appeal. In recent 
unfair labor practice cases, the Board rejected attempts by several religiously affiliated universities 
to overturn earlier election decisions where the Board asserted jurisdiction. See Xavier University, 
Case 3–CA–204564 (NLRB March 9, 2018). However, these were generally procedural rulings 
that do not portend the Board affirming the Pacific Lutheran standard substantively in later cases. 
One of these cases involving Duquesne University was recently appealed to the United States 
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court may address the standard 
there. Duquesne v. NLRB, appeal docketed, No.18-1063 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 2018). 
 
Duquesne University v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 18-1063 (D.C. Cir. 
2018)(appeal pending) 
On September 24, 2018, the AAUP filed an amicus brief in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the “DC Circuit”) in support of a National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”) decision enforcing adjunct faculty rights to unionize at a religiously 
affiliated university. Duquesne University (“Duquesne”) v. National Labor Relations Board, No.-
18-1063 (D.C. Cir. 2018)(appeal pending). The amicus brief argues that there would be no 
unconstitutional entanglement with religion if the NLRB’s analysis in Pacific Lutheran University, 
361 NLRB 1404 (2014)(“Pacific Lutheran”) were applied to determine whether Duquesne’s 
adjunct faculty performed a specific role in creating or maintaining Duquesne’s religious 
educational environment. The amicus brief also outlines how the AAUP’s longstanding principles 
and standards on religious exemptions (or its “limitations clause”) can provide guidance to the 
court in its analysis. 
This case stems from Duquesne’s refusal to recognize a group of unionized adjunct faculty 
in the McAnulty College of Liberal Arts. While the faculty overwhelmingly voted for the union, 
Duquesne refused to deal with the union, asserting that requiring it to do so would constitute 
government entanglement in its religious activities in violation of the US Constitution.  The NLRB 
found that Duquesne did not hold out its adjunct faculty (other than those in the department of 
theology) as performing a “specific religious function” and determined that Duquesne committed 
an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union. The NLRB rejected Duquesne’s 
claim of a religious exemption and Duquesne appealed to the DC Circuit. 
The amicus brief focuses primarily on AAUP’s pivotal 1940 Statement of Principles on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure and the 1940 Statement’s “limitations clause” and argues that these 
provide support for the position that the NLRB can assert jurisdiction over religiously-affiliated 
universities under the jurisdictional test outlined in Pacific Lutheran. “The relevance of the 1940 
Statement’s limitations clause to the issues before this Court goes beyond simply a description of 
its similarity to the Board’s Pacific Lutheran test . . . the 1940 Statement – with its limitations 
clause – has been adopted by hundreds of colleges and universities, including many religiously-
affiliated universities. In adopting the 1940 Statement, religiously-affiliated universities have 
recognized the central importance of adhering to the norms of faculty academic freedom that are 
shared by the community of institutions of higher education. At the same time, religiously-
affiliated universities recognize that the 1940 Statement’s limitations clause protects their 
institutional autonomy to define faculty positions that entail specifically articulated religiously-
based job functions.” 
The amicus brief demonstrates that the AAUP’s “limitations clause” is comparable to the 
NLRB’s Pacific Lutheran standard for determining whether to assert jurisdiction over religiously-
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affiliated universities. Both use an objective “holding out” standard that “defers to the university’s 
definition of faculty functions that are religious-based functions.” The AAUP’s “limitations 
clause” relies on the university’s decision to inform a faculty member at the time of appointment 
of the specific religious functions required for the faculty position; and the NLRB’s jurisdictional 
test follows similar logic—it protects the autonomy of religiously-affiliated universities to define 
faculty positions that require the performance of “religious function.” The amicus brief argues that 
both tests provide a clear and workable framework to determine the scope of an exemption from 
AAUP standards or NLRB jurisdiction. Both tests respect the autonomy of the religiously-
affiliated university to define religious-based functions of its faculty, while also protecting rights 
of faculty outside the scope of a religious-based exemption. 
 
2. Faculty as Managers   
 
Pacific Lutheran University, 361 N.L.R.B. 157 (2014) 
 In this case the National Labor Relations Board published a significant decision expanding 
the organizing rights of private-sector faculty members. The Board modified the standards used to 
determine two important issues affecting the ability of faculty members at private-sector higher 
education institutions to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act: first, whether certain 
institutions and their faculty members are exempted from coverage of the Act due to their religious 
activities (see supra); and second, whether certain faculty members are managers, who are 
excluded from protection of the Act. In addressing this second issue, the Board specifically 
highlighted, as AAUP had in its amicus brief submitted in the case, the increasing corporatization 
of the university. However, this holding is susceptible to reversal under a newly constituted Board. 
 This case started when faculty members at Pacific Lutheran University petitioned for an 
election to be represented by a union. The university challenged the decision to hold the election, 
claiming that some or all of the faculty members were managers and therefore ineligible for union 
representation. The NLRB Regional Director ruled in favor of the union and found that the faculty 
in question do not have enough managerial authority to be precluded from unionizing. Pacific 
Lutheran asked the NLRB to overturn this ruling. The NLRB invited briefs from interested parties 
on the questions regarding whether university faculty members seeking to be represented by a 
union are employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act or excluded as managers and 
whether the NLRB has jurisdiction over faculty members at religious educational institutions. 
 In March 2014, the AAUP submitted an amicus brief urging the NLRB to consider the full 
context when determining whether faculty at private colleges are managerial. The brief described 
the significant changes in university hierarchical and decision-making models since the US 
Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and 
thus ineligible to unionize. The AAUP brief urged the NLRB to consider, when determining the 
managerial status of faculty, factors such as the extent of university administration hierarchy, the 
extent to which the administration makes academic decisions based on market-based 
considerations, the degree of consultation by the administration with faculty governance bodies, 
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whether the administration treats faculty recommendations as advisory rather than as effective 
recommendations, whether the administration routinely approves nearly all faculty 
recommendations without independent administrative review, and whether conflict between the 
administration and the faculty reflects a lack of alignment of administration and faculty interests. 
 In its decision the NLRB ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petitioned for faculty 
members, even though they were employed at a religious institution, and that the faculty members 
were not managers. This second question arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva, 
where the Court found that in certain circumstances faculty may be considered “managers” who 
are excluded from the protections of the Act. The Board noted that the application 
of Yeshiva previously involved an open-ended and uncertain set of criteria for making decisions 
regarding whether faculty were managers. This led to significant complications in determining 
whether the test was met and created uncertainty for all of the parties. 
 Further, in explaining the need for the new standard, the Board specifically highlighted, as 
AAUP had in its amicus brief, the increasing corporatization of the university. The Board stated, 
“Indeed our experience applying Yeshiva has generally shown that colleges and universities are 
increasingly run by administrators, which has the effect of concentrating and centering authority 
away from the faculty in a way that was contemplated in Yeshiva, but found not to exist at Yeshiva 
University itself. Such considerations are relevant to our assessment of whether the faculty 
constitute managerial employees.” 
 In Pacific Lutheran, the Board sought to create a simpler framework for determining 
whether faculty members served as managers. The Board explained that under the new standard, 
“where a party asserts that university faculty are managerial employees, we will examine the 
faculty’s participation in the following areas of decision making: academic programs, enrollment 
management, finances, academic policy, and personnel policies and decisions.” The Board will 
give greater weight to the first three areas, as these are “areas of policy making that affect the 
university as whole.” The Board “will then determine, in the context of the university’s decision 
making structure and the nature of the faculty’s employment relationship with the university, 
whether the faculty actually control or make effective recommendation over those areas. If they 
do, we will find that they are managerial employees and, therefore, excluded from the Act’s 
protections.” 
 The Board emphasized that to be found managers, faculty must in fact have actual control 
or make effective recommendations over policy areas. This requires that “the party asserting 
managerial status must prove actual—rather than mere paper—authority. . . . A faculty handbook 
may state that the faculty has authority over or responsibility for a particular decision-making area, 
but it must be demonstrated that the faculty exercises such authority in fact.” Proof requires 
“specific evidence or testimony regarding the nature and number of faculty decisions or 
recommendations in a particular decision making area, and the subsequent review of those 
decisions or recommendations, if any, by the university administration prior to implementation, 
rather than mere conclusory assertions that decisions or recommendations are generally followed.” 
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Further, the Board used strong language in defining “effective” as meaning that “recommendations 
must almost always be followed by the administration” or “routinely become operative without 
independent review by the administration.” 
 
University of Southern California v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 17-1149 
(D.C. Cir. March 12, 2019) 
 On March 12, 2019, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision in 
this case. On December 28, 2017 AAUP submitted an amicus brief, written primarily by Risa 
Lieberwitz, to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit urging the court to uphold the NLRB’s 
determination that non-tenure-track faculty at USC are not managerial employees. The brief 
supported the legal framework established by the NLRB in Pacific Lutheran University and 
describes in detail the significant changes in university hierarchical and decision-making models 
since the US Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that faculty at Yeshiva University were managerial 
employees and thus ineligible to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act. In its decision, 
the DC Circuit Court generally upheld the Pacific Lutheran University framework, it found that 
the Board erred when it held that the faculty in the proposed unit alone must effectively control 
university committees.  
This case arose when SEIU filed a petition to represent non-tenure-track full-time and part-
time faculty in two colleges within USC. USC objected to the petition, arguing that the faculty 
were managers under Yeshiva. The Board applied the test established in Pacific Lutheran 
University, 361 NLRB 1404 (2014) (in which AAUP had also filed an amicus brief) and found 
that the faculty in the units were not managerial and therefore were eligible to unionize. One key 
factor in this finding was that the NTT faculty did not constitute a majority of university 
committees and therefore did not exercise effective control over the committees. After the union 
won the election in the Roski School of Art and Design, USC refused to bargain, citing its 
objection, and the Board ordered USC to bargain. USC appealed to the US Court of Appeals for 
the DC Circuit, arguing that the faculty had no right to unionize as they were managerial 
employees.   
The court held that the Board had appropriately followed the instructions of the courts in 
creating a more detailed and specific test for determining whether faculty were managerial. 
However, the court focused on one particular factor in overturning the Board’s decision: namely, 
whether the faculty in the petitioned for unit (called a “subgroup), not just the faculty as a whole, 
exercised control over committees by constituting a majority on the committees. Instead the court 
said “the focus should be whether the faculty body writ large exercised effective control, and 
whether the particular subgroup seeking certification was included in that faculty body.” Thus, it 
stated “the question the Board must ask is not a numerical one—does the subgroup seeking 
recognition comprise a majority of a committee—but rather a broader, structural one: has the 
university included the subgroup in a faculty body vested with managerial responsibilities?” The 
court recognized that non-tenure track faculty might not actually participate in committees, or 
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might have conflicts with other faculty, such that they did not exercise any managerial control. 
Thus, the court summarized the Board’s error and its understanding of an appropriate standard.  
Pacific Lutheran, as interpreted by the Board in this case, runs afoul of Yeshiva by using . 
. . a determination focused on whether the petitioning subgroup alone exercises effective 
control. The Board should instead, as required by Yeshiva, think of this analysis as having 
two distinct inquiries: whether a faculty body exercises effective control and, if so, 
whether, based on the faculty's structure and operations, the petitioning subgroup is 
included in that managerial faculty body. Only as part of the latter analysis should the 
Board dig into whether a subgroup's actual interests diverge so substantially from those 
championed by the rest of the faculty that holding a minority of seats on the relevant 
committees is akin to having no managerial role at all, or whether a subgroup's low 
participation rates stem from a tenuous employment relationship that vitiates any 
managerial role the university expects the subgroup to perform. 
The Court also addressed the arguments advanced by the AAUP. 
A final observation: in Pacific Lutheran, the Board emphasized that since the Court decided 
Yeshiva some four decades ago, universities "are increasingly run by administrators" and 
rely more and more on non-tenure-track faculty "who, unlike traditional faculty, have been 
appointed with no prospect of tenure and often no guarantee of employment." Pacific 
Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1422. According to the Board, these trends "ha[ve] the effect of 
concentrating and centering authority away from the faculty." Id. Building on this point, 
amicus American Association of University Professors points out that "[r]ather than relying 
on faculty expertise and recommendations, the growing ranks of administrators 
increasingly make unilateral decisions on university policies and programs, often 
influenced by considerations of external market forces and revenue generation." American 
Association of University Professors' Br. 10. By contrast, the American Council on 
Education, though acknowledging these trends, emphasizes "the continued primacy of 
shared governance." ACE Br. 13. This is an interesting debate, and it may even be relevant. 
Regardless of national trends, however, the Board must not lose sight of the fact that the 
question before it in any case in which a faculty subgroup seeks recognition is whether that 
university has delegated managerial authority to a faculty body and, if so, whether the 
petitioning faculty subgroup is a part of that body. As we explained in Point Park, this 
requires "an exacting analysis of the particular institution and faculty at issue." 457 F.3d at 
48 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, the court rejected challenges by USC to the Pacific Lutheran University decision more 
broadly, to the Pacific Lutheran University standard for “effective” control, and to the Pacific 
Lutheran University categorization of work by the faculty. Because the court overturned the 
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Board’s decision it remanded the case to the Board to “reconsider the case afresh.” Unfortunately, 
this could lead to the new Board substantially altering the current Pacific Lutheran University 
standard. 
   
3. Graduate Assistants’ Right to Organize 
 
Columbia University, 364 N.L.R.B. 90 (2016)  
Echoing arguments made by the AAUP in an amicus brief, the National Labor Relations 
Board held that student assistants working at private colleges and universities are statutory 
employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act. The 3–1 decision overrules a 2004 
decision in Brown University, which had found that graduate assistants were not employees and 
therefore did not have statutory rights to unionize. However, this decision is susceptible to reversal 
under a newly constituted Board.  
The AAUP filed an amicus brief with the Board arguing that extending collective 
bargaining rights to student employees promotes academic freedom and does not harm faculty-
student mentoring relationships, and instead would reflect the reality that the student employees 
were performing the work of the university when fulfilling their duties. In reversing Brown, the 
majority said that the earlier decision “deprived an entire category of workers of the protections of 
the Act without a convincing justification.” The Board found that granting collective bargaining 
rights to student employees would not infringe on First Amendment academic freedom and, citing 
the AAUP amicus brief, would not seriously harm the ability of universities to function. The Board 
also relied on the AAUP amicus brief when it found that the duties of graduate assistant constituted 
work for the university and were not primarily educational. 
Despite the instability that this would add to the NLRB’s precedents, the newly constituted 
NLRB could overrule Columbia University and return to the Brown University holding that 
graduate assistants are not employees under the NLRA. In Columbia, Republican-appointed 
member Miscimarra filed a vigorous dissent arguing that the Board’s earlier decision and 
reasoning in Brown were correct. Id. at 24-25. The position in this dissent would likely represent 
the position of the majority of the new Republican-dominated Board.  
Unions representing graduate student employees have withdrawn pending NLRB petitions 
and charges, and are not filing new petitions or charges, which would result in the NLRB not 
having the opportunity to review and reverse or modify the Columbia University decision. 
Therefore, it appears that there are not currently any pending cases before the NLRB that would 
allow the NLRB to overrule Columbia University. However, it is possible that such a case could 
reach the NLRB. 
 
B. Bargaining Units 
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Yale University, 365 N.L.R.B. 40 (2017); PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 N.L.R.B. 160 
(2017); University of Pennsylvania, 04-RC-199609 (NLRB Reg. 4, Dec. 19, 2017) 
Another area in which there has recently been significant change is in the standard for 
determining the appropriate bargaining unit for collective bargaining. In Specialty Healthcare & 
Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), the Board modified its standards for 
making unit determinations when a representation petition is filed and clarified that a unit proposed 
by the union, even a small one, would be appropriate when a petitioned-for unit consists of 
employees who are readily identifiable as a group, and the employees in the group share a 
community of interest, unless the party seeking a larger unit demonstrates that employees in the 
larger unit share an overwhelming community of interest with those in the petitioned-for unit.  
However, in PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017) the new Board overruled 
Specialty Health Care, throwing into question recent decisions of the Board on bargaining units at 
colleges and universities.  
In Yale University, 365 NLRB No. 40 (Feb. 22, 2017), the NLRB applied the Specialty 
Healthcare standard and approved an election for graduate students in nine separate units. Yale 
contended that the graduate students were not employees, asserting that the Board’s earlier 
Columbia University decision was wrongly decided, and alternatively even under that standard the 
graduate students were not employees.  
On December 15, 2017, one day before Chairman Philip A. Miscimarra’s term on the 
Board expired, the Board issued PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (N.L.R.B. December 
15, 2017), which overruled Specialty Healthcare and reinstated the prior community-of-interest 
standard for determining an appropriate bargaining unit in union representation cases. Newly 
appointed members Marvin E. Kaplan (R) and William J. Emanuel (R) joined Miscimarra in the 
3-2 decision. This important decision was issued without the normal request for amicus briefs, and 
it was followed by a NLRB General Counsel Memorandum, OM 18-05, that specifies that 
employers will be allowed to raise issues with previously determined or agreed to bargaining units.  
On December 19, 2017, Regional Director Dennis Walsh applied the Board’s new standard 
to an election petition involving graduate students at the University of Pennsylvania. University of 
Pennsylvania, 04-RC-199609 (NLRB Reg. 4, Dec. 19, 2017). The Regional Director outlined the 
legal standard under PCC Structurals. 
 
The Act requires only that a petitioner seek representation of employees in an 
appropriate unit, not in the most appropriate unit possible. Overnite Transportation Co., 
322 NLRB 723 (1996). Thus, the Board first determines whether the unit proposed by a 
petitioner is appropriate. When the Board determines that the employees in the unit sought 
by a petitioner share a community of interest, the Board must next evaluate whether the 
interests of that group are “sufficiently distinct from those of other [excluded] employees 
to warrant establishment of a separate unit.” PCC Structurals, 365 NLRB No. 160, slip op. 
at 7 (Dec. 15, 2017) quoting Wheeling Island Gaming, 355 NLRB 637, 642 fn. 2 (2010). 
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Specifically, the inquiry is whether “’excluded employees have meaningfully distinct 
interests in the context of collective bargaining that outweigh similarities with unit 
members.’” PCC Structurals, supra, slip op. at 11, quoting Constellation Brands, U.S. 
Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 842 F.3d 784, 794 (2d Cir. 2016). In making this assessment, 
PCC Structurals instructs the decision-maker to assess [w]hether the employees are 
organized into a separate department; have distinct skills and training; have distinct job 
functions and perform distinct work, including inquiry into the amount and type of job 
overlap between classifications; are functionally integrated with the Employer’s other 
employees; have frequent contact with other employees; interchange with other employees; 
have distinct terms and conditions of employment; and are separately supervised. Id., slip 
op. at 5 (quoting United Operations, Inc., 338 NLRB 123, 123 (2002). Particularly 
important in considering whether the unit sought is appropriate are the organization of the 
facility and the utilization of skills. Gustave Fisher, Inc., 256 NLRB 1069, 1069 fn. 5 
(1981). However, all relevant factors must be weighed in determining community of 
interest.  
Id. at 21. 
Applying these standards, Walsh directed that students from the business and engineering 
schools — who were previously excluded — must also be included in the bargaining unit: 
 
[B]ased on the record and relevant Board cases, including the Board’s recently minted 
decision in PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160 (Dec. 15, 2017) overturning 
Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 NLRB 934 (2011), enfd. 
727 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2013), I find, in agreement with the Employer, that a unit limited to 
graduate student employees in the seven petitioned-for schools is not appropriate, and that 
to constitute an appropriate unit it must also include graduate students in both the Wharton 
School and the School of Engineering and Applied Science because the interests of the 
former group are not sufficiently distinct from those of the latter group to warrant a separate 
unit. 
Id. at 2. 
In February 2018 the union in the University of Pennsylvania case withdrew its election 
petition and therefore the Board will not address the bargaining unit standard in this case.  
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C. NLRB Elections 
 
NLRB Election Rules, 29 CFR Parts 101, 102, and 103; Request for Information 
Regarding Representation Election Regulations, RIN 3142-AA12 (NLRB Dec. 14, 
2017) 
In December 2014 the NLRB issued revisions to union election rules that vastly simplified 
and expedited the election process. However, this election rule may be retracted or changed by the 
new Board based on a recent Request for Information.  
On December 15, 2014, the Board published the Election Rule, which amended the Board’s 
prior Election Regulations. 79 Fed. Reg. 74308 (2014). The final rule became effective on April 
14, 2015, and has been applicable to all representation cases filed on or after that date. Lawsuits 
challenging the facial validity of the Election Rule were rejected, with the Courts finding that the 
changes were not arbitrary or capricious and did not violate federal statutes or the Constitution. 
See Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(The “rule, on its face, does not violate the National Labor Relations Act or the Administrative 
Procedure Act[.]”); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 
3d 171, 220 (D.D.C. 2015). 
The 2014 Election Rule includes the following: Provides for electronic filing and 
transmission of election petitions and other documents; Ensures that employees, employers and 
unions receive timely information they need to understand and participate in the representation 
case process; Eliminates or reduces unnecessary litigation, duplication and delay; Adopts best 
practices and uniform procedures across regions; Requires that additional contact information 
(personal telephone numbers and email addresses) be included in voter lists, to the extent that 
information is available to the employer, in order to enhance information sharing by permitting 
other parties to the election to communicate with voters about the election; and Allows parties to 
consolidate all election-related appeals to the Board into a single appeals process. Cumulatively, 
these changes will likely reduce the time from the filing of a representation petition to the holding 
of an election to between 10 and 20 days. 
Some of the new provisions are particularly important for faculty members. For example, 
the new election rules require that employers provide the union with personal email addresses and 
phone numbers for employees. This is particularly important for reaching out to contingent faculty, 
who often perform most of their work off campus.  Also, parties must be aware that the NLRB 
representation hearing and election process is extremely fast paced and the NLRB will rarely grant 
requests for extensions of time. Therefore, parties should be fully aware of the revised rules and 
prepared for the hearing and election process prior to filing any election petition with the NLRB.  
However, a recent Request for Information issued by the Board indicates the Board may 
modify or rescind the 2014 election rule. On December 14, 2017, the National Labor Relations 
Board published a Request for Information in the Federal Register, asking for public input 
regarding the Board’s 2014 Election Rule, which modified the Board’s representation-election 
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procedures located at 29 CFR parts 101 and 102. The Board sought information from interested 
parties regarding three questions: 
1. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained without change? 
2. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained with modifications? If so, what should be 
modified? 
3. Should the 2014 Election Rule be rescinded? If so, should the Board revert to the 
Representation Election Regulations that were in effect prior to the 2014 Election Rule’s 
adoption, or should the Board make changes to the prior Representation Election 
Regulations? If the Board should make changes to the prior Representation Election 
Regulations, what should be changed? 
Responses to this request were originally due on April 18, 2018.  
 The Request for Information was approved by former Board Chairman Philip A. 
Miscimarra and Board Members Marvin E. Kaplan (now Chairman) and William J. Emanuel. 
Board Members Mark Gaston Pearce and Lauren McFerran dissented.  The majority noted that the 
request “does not suggest even a single specific change in current representation election 
procedures.” Id. at 3. However, member McFerren in a dissent argued that “the nature and timing 
of this [request], along with its faulty justifications, suggests that the majority’s interest lies  . . . in 
manufacturing a rationale for a subsequent rollback of the Rule in light of the change in the 
composition of the Board.” Id. at 11. 
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